Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439

PFI owns six Redskins Marks registered 1967–1990; TTAB cancelled registrations as they may disparage Native Americans.
Blackhorse Defendants petitioned to cancel the registrations; case proceeded as a de novo §1071(b) review in district court.
Harjo litigation and related proceedings provide the evidentiary backdrop and record supplementation for the court’s analysis.
Court considers three evidentiary pillars for ‘may disparage’: dictionaries/usage labels, scholarly/media references, and Native American individuals’ or leaders’ statements.
Court holds that registrations may disparage a substantial composite of Native Americans during 1967–1990 and cancels the six registrations; TTAB order affirmed.
Court determines constitutional challenges fail: Section 2(a) is not First Amendment implicated (government speech), not void-for-vagueness, and Takings/Due Process challenges fail; laches not a bar.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Lanham Act §2(a) implicate the First Amendment?	PFI argues §2(a) restricts speech and is unconstitutional.	Blackhorse/US contend the program is government speech and exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.	Section 2(a) does not implicate the First Amendment; program is government speech.
Is §2(a) void-for-vagueness under the Fifth Amendment?	PFI contends §2(a) lacks notice and enables arbitrary enforcement.	Blackhorse/US argue §2(a) provides fair warning and guidelines; not void as applied.	§2(a) is not void-for-vagueness; it provides fair warning and guidelines; as-applied challenges fail.
Does the TTAB cancellation violate due process or takings?	PFI asserts due process and takings infringements via TTAB order.	Blackhorse/US argue no property interest in registrations; no takings or due process violation.	Takings/Due Process claims fail; trademark registrations are not property interests under the Fifth Amendment.
Do the Redskins Marks ‘may disparage’ Native Americans such that registrations must be cancelled?	PFI contends the record fails to show a substantial composite believed disparaged.	Blackhorse Defendants show dictionary, scholarly, and Native American leader evidence establishes ‘may disparage’.	Yes; the record shows the marks may disparage a substantial composite of Native Americans in the relevant period, supporting cancellation.

Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (U.S. 2015) (government speech framework for official programs)
SCV v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002) (mixed/hybrid speech factors for government vs private speech)
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (U.S. 1991) (government may determine contents/limits of its programs)
Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004) (government program contents limits authority; Rust applied)
In re Boulevard Ent., Inc., 334 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (dictionary usage labels can demonstrate ‘may disparage’)
In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (unregistered/existing marks context for disparagement)
In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (registration denial as non-morality judgment; government speech context)
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (TTAB 1999) (TTAB disparagement findings and Native American perspectives cited)
Open Society Foundations v. Alliance for Open Society Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (U.S. 2013) (government program funds and constitutional constraints guidance)
In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (TTAB 2008) (usage labels and disparagement analysis in TTAB context)
B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (U.S. 2015) (preclusion/now-adopted principles in registration context)