Priscilla Lewis, Personal Representative of the Estate of Clarence Lewis v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company, 5D2024-1567

Background

Clarence Lewis worked for Norfolk Southern from 1975–2014 (primarily as an engineer) and was routinely exposed to diesel exhaust and benzene at the rail yard; coworkers described spills, soot on clothes, and lack of warnings.
Lewis was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukemia in 2011, retired in 2014, and died three months later; his wife filed a FELA wrongful-death suit in 2017 against Norfolk.
Plaintiff designated two experts: Dr. Mark Levin (medical causation) and Dr. Paul Rosenfeld (liability/exposure). Rosenfeld opined Norfolk knew since the 1950s that diesel exhaust is carcinogenic and failed to implement protections or warnings.
Rosenfeld quantified occupational benzene/diesel exposure by converting elemental carbon (EC) measurements to diesel particulate matter (DPM) and then used the EPA Superfund Risk Assessment tool to estimate increased cancer risk; he did not opine specific causation for Lewis’s leukemia (that was Levin’s role).
Norfolk moved to exclude Rosenfeld under Daubert, arguing his EC→DPM conversion is novel/unvalidated and the EPA Superfund tool targets lung cancer/Superfund contexts, not railyards or chronic lymphocytic leukemia; the trial court excluded Rosenfeld and then entered summary judgment for Norfolk after plaintiff conceded she could not meet FELA proof without him.
The Fifth District reversed: it held the trial court abused its gatekeeping discretion in excluding Rosenfeld; his methodology and application issues were for cross‑examination and jury resolution, and Rosenfeld’s role was liability (not medical causation).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of liability expert (Daubert reliability)	Rosenfeld used EC→DPM conversion and EPA risk tool to show significant occupational exposure and industry knowledge supporting liability; methodology reliable enough for admissibility	Conversion methodology is novel, untested, lacking peer consensus; EPA Superfund tool not tailored to railyards and addresses lung cancer, not CLL, so unreliable and inapplicable	Reversed exclusion: court found trial judge abused discretion; methodological challenges go to weight/cross‑examination, not wholesale exclusion
Fit between expert methods and case facts	Rosenfeld’s exposure opinions relevant to whether Norfolk breached duties and failed to warn or control hazards	Norfolk: tools address different contexts/diseases so insufficient “fit,” risk of misleading jury	Court: Rosenfeld was a liability (exposure) expert; questions about disease‑specific causation are for the medical expert and jury; admissible
Effect of exclusion on summary judgment	With Rosenfeld excluded plaintiff cannot prove breach/notice/exposure, so summary judgment appropriate	Exclusion was error; with admissible testimony plaintiff should be allowed to proceed to jury	Reversed summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings
Scope of Daubert gatekeeping vs. jury role	Proponent must show methodology is reliable and applied; but gatekeeping should not supplant adversary process	Norfolk urged stricter gatekeeping to exclude novel methods	Court emphasized flexible Daubert inquiry and that exclusion is exceptional; tools like cross‑examination suffice where methodology is contestable

Key Cases Cited

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (trial court gatekeeping factors for expert admissibility)
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (Daubert gatekeeping applies to all expert testimony; factors flexible)
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (FELA’s broad remedial purpose and low causation threshold)
Vitiello v. State, 281 So. 3d 554 (Florida discussion of relevance and reliability under Daubert)
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Spearman, 320 So. 3d 276 (trial court’s gatekeeping duties under Florida law)
Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Burns, 402 So. 3d 1178 (standard of review for Daubert exclusion)