505 F.Supp.3d 1352
Ct. Int'l Trade2021Background
- Proclamation 9980 (Jan. 24, 2020) imposed a 25% duty on certain steel derivative articles (including nails) and cited Section 232 as authority.
- PrimeSource sued, alleging among other things that Proclamation 9980 was untimely under the 105-day/90+15-day timing limits in 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1); other claims were dismissed in PrimeSource I.
- PrimeSource I held Count 2 (timeliness) plausible and identified factual issues whether later Commerce Department “assessments” functioned as the Section 232(b)(3)(A) report required to start the statutory clock.
- In a Joint Status Report, defendants waived the opportunity to present additional factual evidence and expressly declined to argue that the Secretary’s post-2018 assessments satisfied Section 232 procedural requirements.
- Given defendants’ waiver and absence of any genuine dispute of material fact, the court (under USCIT Rule 56(f) and Celotex) entered summary judgment for PrimeSource, holding Proclamation 9980 issued after the President’s delegated authority expired and therefore invalid.
- Remedy: declaratory judgment invalidating Proclamation 9980; affected entries to be liquidated without duties under Proclamation 9980 and refunds (with interest) ordered as appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Proclamation 9980 comply with Section 232(c)(1) timing (105-day/90+15-day limits)? | Proclamation was untimely because the 105-day/90+15-day periods began with the Commerce Secretary’s 2018 Steel Report and expired before Proclamation 9980. | Proclamation timely because subsequent Commerce assessments or prior Proclamation 9705 satisfied the Section 232 procedural prerequisites. | Court held Proclamation 9980 untimely; issued after delegated authority expired and thus invalid. |
| May the court enter summary judgment sua sponte after giving notice? | Court may do so when the adverse party had fair opportunity to present evidence. | No objection after defendants waived evidence and asked for prompt judgment. | Court exercised sua sponte summary judgment authority (USCIT R.56(f)/Celotex) and entered judgment for plaintiff. |
| Are the Section 232 timing provisions directory or mandatory; was any procedural violation significant? | Timing limits are mandatory; untimeliness is a significant procedural violation warranting invalidation. | Argued (earlier) that timing limits could be directory and not jurisdictional. | Court rejected directory reading and found a significant procedural violation supporting invalidation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (district courts may enter summary judgment sua sponte with notice; party must be given opportunity to present evidence)
- Exigent Tech., Inc. v. Atrana Sols., Inc., 442 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (sua sponte summary-judgment power requires notice to party with burden of proof)
- Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (court may invalidate executive action for clear misconstruction, significant procedural violation, or action outside delegated authority)