Prime United Petroleum Holding Company, LLC. v. Malameel, LLC & Mark Alameel, Individually, 05-20-00032-CV

Background

Beginning December 2014 Prime agreed to fund a 3D-camera project monthly (planned $120,000 total); Prime advanced about $49,000 by February 2015.
At a February 20, 2015 meeting Prime learned only ~$20,000 had gone to the inventor; Prime thereafter demanded accounting and pressed for a written contract.
Prime notified Alameel on March 26 and April 1, 2015 that funding was on hold and requested return of invested funds; Alameel emailed April 2 saying he would repay “ASAP” via a new investor but never repaid.
Prime relies on a February 24, 2015 email in which Alameel asked counsel to extend a proposed repayment-start window from 30 to “at least 90 days”; Prime contends this induced continued investment and created a 90-day repayment promise.
Prime sued for fraud on May 31, 2019 seeking recovery of about $60,694.20; defendants moved for summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds asserting Prime knew of its injury in March–April 2015.
The trial court granted summary judgment finding Prime knew or should have known of its fraud injury by April–May 2015; this appeal followed and the appellate court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Did Prime know of its legal injury by April 1, 2015 (accrual date)?	Accrual did not occur until 90 days after Prime requested repayment (i.e., July 1, 2015) because Alameel promised repayment would start 90 days after a refund request.	Prime knew of the misappropriation no later than April–May 2015; the 90-day email request was not a binding promise and Prime expected immediate repayment.	Court held the 90-day language was not a binding representation; accrual occurred by May 1, 2015 (30-day repayment expectation), so suit filed in May 2019 was untimely.
2) Was the matter ripe/was Prime aware by April 27, 2015 (e.g., when defendants engaged counsel)?	Not ripe until the 90-day period lapsed; no injury until promised repayment failed.	Prime was aware of the alleged misappropriation earlier and defendants’ retention of counsel confirmed awareness.	Court concluded Prime knew or should have known earlier; ripeness/accrual was not delayed by the asserted 90-day promise.
3) Did Prime raise a material fact issue defeating summary judgment on limitations?	The February 24 email created a fact issue about a fraudulent inducement and delayed accrual to July 1, 2015.	The email was a request to counsel (not a binding promise), later communications show Prime expected immediate repayment; no genuine fact issue.	Court found no fact issue; summary judgment on limitations was proper.
4) Did the trial court err by allowing defendants to supplement but not Prime before ruling?	Trial court deprived Prime of a fair opportunity to supplement its response before ruling.	Plaintiff waived the complaint on appeal by failing to brief authorities; even if not waived, no reversible error shown.	Issue waived for inadequate briefing; alternatively, no reversible error shown — appellate court overruled the claim.

Key Cases Cited

Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015) (standard of review for summary judgment).
Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) (movant’s burden on traditional summary judgment).
Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1996) (burden shifts to nonmovant after movant’s summary-judgment proof).
Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. 2011) (fraud statute of limitations begins when party knows of the misrepresentation).
Hoover v. Gregory, 835 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) (fraud accrues when the allegedly false representation is made).
Lozada v. Farrall & Blackwell Agency, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (what constitutes a binding promise).
In re B.A.B., 124 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (issues inadequately briefed are waived).