Priests for Life v. United States Department of Health & Human Services
772 F.3d 229
D.C. Cir.2014Background
- This case challenges whether the ACA contraceptive coverage accommodation for religious nonprofits imposes an unjustified RFRA burden on religious exercise.
- Plaintiffs, eleven Catholic organizations including the Archdiocese and Priests for Life, object to contraceptive coverage and to the accommodation that lets them opt out.
- The accommodation allows eligible religious organizations to opt out by self-certification or an alternative notice, after which insurers/TPAs provide contraceptive coverage directly to beneficiaries.
- Plaintiffs’ health plans vary (self-insured, ERISA-covered, or private group plans); some are church plans exempt from ERISA, others are not.
- The district court found no substantial RFRA burden and upheld the accommodation; the D.C. Circuit certified and reviewed on appeal, ultimately affirming in part and vacating in part.
- The court assesses RFRA burdens, the government’s compelling interests, and whether the accommodation is the least restrictive means, as well as related constitutional and APA challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| RFRA substantial burden | Priests for Life argues the accommodation compels or facilitates contraception, causing a substantial RFRA burden. | Government contends the opt-out is a de minimis administrative step and the burden lies on third parties, not plaintiffs. | Accommodation does not impose a substantial RFRA burden. |
| Least restrictive means & compelling interests | RFRA requires the burden to be the least restrictive means; accommodation may not be essential to interests. | Accommodation is narrowly tailored and furthers compelling interests in public health and gender equality. | Accommodation uses the least restrictive means to advance compelling interests. |
| Constitutional challenges (First Amendment & Establishment Clause) | Defs argue exemptions create non-neutrality; plaintiffs challenge free exercise, expressive association, compelled speech, and establishment concerns. | Regulations are neutral, generally applicable, and do not excessively entangle or coerce speech; exemptions are constitutionally permissible. | Constitutional claims fail; RFRA ruling controls, and Establishment/First Amendment challenges do not prevail. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Supreme Court 2014) (RFRA and accommodation discussed; government interests and tailoring analyzed)
- Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014) (RFRA and contraception accommodation upheld; related reasoning cited)
- Michigan Catholic Conf. & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014) (Affirmed accommodation as consistent with RFRA)
- Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Substantial burden determination and RFRA framework)
- Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (Supreme Court 1986) (Third-party burdens not attributable to objector; RFRA context cited)
- United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (Supreme Court 1982) (Compelling public interest in participation in social insurance systems)
- Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (Supreme Court 1944) (Public health interests sustain regulatory schemes over individual religious objections)
- Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (Supreme Court 1988) (Incidental effects of government programs on religion do not render actions unconstitutional)
- Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (Supreme Court 2012) (Ministerial exception discussed; not controlling here)
- Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (Supreme Court 2006) (Expressive association principles applied to on-campus access by recruiters)