Priego, Marisol, PD-0269-15

Appellant Marisol Priego was found unconscious in the driver’s seat of her truck in a public parking lot; the engine was running, she wore a seatbelt, and a partially consumed whiskey bottle was on the floorboard.
Witnesses saw the truck arrive within a short interval (manager left ~4:00 p.m.; truck present ~15–20 minutes later); police arrived ~5:12 p.m.; blood drawn at 6:15 p.m. showed BAC 0.478.
Priego testified she bought two bottles, drank one and part of the second in the parking lot, and passed out; no one observed her driving the truck.
She was convicted of DWI (third or more) and sentenced to ten years; she appealed asserting legally insufficient evidence that she “operated” the vehicle while intoxicated.
The court of appeals affirmed (modifying the judgment to delete a future attorney-fee assessment), finding the totality of circumstances permitted a jury inference that Priego operated the truck while intoxicated.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a person found unconscious in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle may be said to have “operated” it for DWI	Priego: The State failed to prove she operated the vehicle while intoxicated; sleeping in a parked vehicle is not per se operation and there is no direct evidence she drank before driving	State: The combination of a running engine, seatbelt in use, presence of alcoholic container, witness timeline, and lack of any other operator permits a reasonable inference of operation while intoxicated	Court: Affirmed — under totality-of-circumstances, jury could reasonably infer operation while intoxicated
Whether the State must prove a temporal link between driving and intoxication	Priego: Argues the need for an established temporal link (citing cases requiring such a link)	State: Relies on inferences from circumstances to connect intoxication to operation without direct proof of timing	Court: Treated temporal link via circumstantial evidence as satisfied here; referenced but distinguished contrary authority and relied on broad interpretation of “operating”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence)
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (framework for Jackson sufficiency review in Texas)
Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (use totality of circumstances to define “operating”)
Denton v. State, 911 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (action to affect vehicle functioning need not be driving; operation interpreted broadly)
Kuciemba v. State, 310 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (discusses requirement of temporal link between operation and intoxication)