Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.
2015 IL 117687
| Ill. | 2015Background
- Plaintiffs (Price and Fruth) won in Madison County circuit court on a consumer‑fraud class action against Philip Morris for marketing "Lights," with a $10.1 billion judgment entered in 2003.
- This Court reversed on direct review in Price v. Philip Morris, holding the FTC had "specifically authorized" use of the descriptors and remanded with instructions to dismiss; mandate issued Dec. 2006 and the circuit court entered a dismissal.
- Plaintiffs later filed a section 2‑1401 petition (Dec. 18, 2008) in circuit court, relying on post‑Price FTC statements (and related developments) that they said constituted newly available evidence undermining this Court’s Price decision.
- The circuit court denied relief on the merits (finding uncertainty that the Supreme Court would have ruled differently on damages); the appellate court reversed and ordered reinstatement of the original verdict, treating the petition as proper under section 2‑1401.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted review and held that section 2‑1401 does not authorize a circuit court to vacate the judgment of a reviewing court; relief from a reviewing‑court judgment must be sought by a motion to recall the mandate in the reviewing court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a circuit court may grant section 2‑1401 relief to vacate a judgment issued by a reviewing court | Section 2‑1401 is broadly worded and permits relief in "every case" regardless of the nature of the order; plaintiffs filed in the circuit court because that court entered the dismissal | A circuit court lacks authority to vacate a reviewing court's judgment; the petition improperly seeks to undo this Court’s Price decision and the circuit court is not the "same proceeding" where that judgment was entered | Held: No. Section 2‑1401 does not authorize a circuit court to vacate a reviewing court's judgment; relief must be pursued by motion to recall the mandate in the reviewing court. |
| Whether a section 2‑1401 petition may properly target a dismissal order entered in the circuit court pursuant to a reviewing‑court mandate when the petition effectively challenges the reviewing court’s merits ruling | The dismissal order was entered in circuit court and section 2‑1401 applies to "every case"; petition therefore properly filed in circuit court to vacate the dismissal | A dismissal entered under a reviewing court's mandate is ministerial and, when the attack is on the underlying merits, a merits‑based challenge necessarily targets the reviewing court’s judgment, not the ministerial act | Held: No. A merits‑based section 2‑1401 petition that would in effect undo the reviewing court’s ruling is improper in circuit court; the petition here attacked Price and thus was beyond circuit court authority. |
| Proper procedural remedy to challenge a reviewing‑court judgment after mandate issues | Section 2‑1401 is the statutory vehicle for postjudgment relief and may be used here | The appropriate remedy is a motion to recall the mandate filed in the reviewing court (and appellate courts have inherent power to recall mandates) | Held: A motion to recall the mandate in the reviewing court is the proper vehicle; the Supreme Court’s rules (and practice) provide for such motions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill. 2d 182 (Ill. 2005) (this Court’s prior decision reversing the circuit court on section 10b(1) grounds)
- Warren County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783 (Ill. 2015) (describing section 2‑1401 as the statutory analog to coram nobis and the scope of postjudgment relief)
- Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (U.S. 1976) (addressing district‑court reopening after appellate review and the interplay with Rule 60(b))
- Hazel‑Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford‑Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1944) (historical recognition of appellate courts’ mandate and powers to address extraordinary circumstances)
- Klose v. Mende, 378 Ill. App. 3d 942 (Ill. App. 2008) (appellate decision discussed by parties; distinguished by the Supreme Court because remand there was not reduced to a ministerial order before the 2‑1401 petition)