PRICE v. COLVIN, 1:16-cv-00056

Plaintiff Anita Marie Price sought Supplemental Security Income; ALJ denied benefits and the district court reviewed that denial on cross-motions for summary judgment.
At the administrative hearing, a vocational expert (VE) testified in response to an ALJ hypothetical describing limitations (routine, repetitive tasks; only occasional judgment/changes; occasional interaction). The VE identified jobs the claimant could perform.
The ALJ asked a follow-up hypothetical adding an additional limitation: missing at least three work days per month; the VE testified that such absences would preclude sustaining employment.
The ALJ did not incorporate the three-day-per-month absence limitation into the RFC, finding the record did not support it, and relied on the VE’s answer to the original hypothetical.
Plaintiff argued the ALJ erred by failing to rely on the VE’s follow-up testimony and by not developing the record regarding the frequency/duration/ scheduling of medical appointments.
The district court concluded the ALJ’s RFC reflected only limitations supported by the record, that the ALJ adequately explained rejecting the three-day absence limitation, and that the ALJ fulfilled his duty to develop the record; therefore the Commissioner’s decision was affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ALJ erred by relying on VE’s answer to original hypothetical instead of follow-up hypothetical adding 3 absences/month	Price: VE’s follow-up showing 3+ absences/month would preclude work and is supported by her appointment history, so ALJ should have relied on it	Commissioner: ALJ permissibly relied on VE testimony tied to RFC limitations the ALJ found supported by the record; follow-up limitation was not supported	Court: No error — ALJ reasonably rejected the 3-day/month limitation as unsupported and relied on VE response to an appropriate hypothetical
Whether ALJ failed to develop full and fair record about appointment frequency/duration and impact on work	Price: ALJ should have obtained more evidence and asked VE about 20–60 minute appointments’ work impact	Commissioner: Record contained medical appointment records; claimant and counsel had burden to submit additional evidence; ALJ asked counsel if anything further was needed	Court: No failure — ALJ admitted records, questioned counsel, and was not required to seek evidence that was not shown to be missing

Jesurum v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 1995) (standard for substantial evidence review)
Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir. 1992) (court may not reweigh evidence if administrative finding supported by substantial evidence)
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1988) (substantial evidence standard)
Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (same principle regarding deference to Commissioner where substantial evidence exists)
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981) (courts should not reweigh evidence and must defer to ALJ when supported by substantial evidence)
Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1984) (hypothetical to VE must reflect impairments supported by record)
Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1987) (same)
Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900 (3d Cir. 1995) (ALJ’s duty to develop full and fair record)
Carmichael v. Barnhart, 104 Fed. Appx. 803 (3d Cir. 2004) (addressing duty to develop record in Social Security proceedings)