375 F. Supp. 3d 1264
M.D. Fla.2019Background
- Plaintiff Joel Price, a blind Florida resident, visited the City of Ocala’s website and alleges portions were incompatible with his screen reader, causing exclusion from city services and programs.
- Price sued under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act seeking injunctive relief; City moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing (no injury-in-fact or imminent future injury).
- Complaint alleges visits in December 2018 and January 20, 2019, continuing inability to access unspecified electronic documents, generalized feelings of exclusion, and a desire/plan to read City documents weekly.
- Price did not allege that he lives in Ocala, is a constituent, has concrete plans to visit or move there, or identify specific inaccessible documents on the site in the complaint.
- The court identified a lack of controlling Title II website standing law and developed a tailored framework for Title II website cases, distinct from Title III website jurisprudence.
- Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing but allowed Price 14 days to amend because the opinion articulated factors he could address.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing to pursue Title II ADA website claim | Price alleged injury from inaccessible website pages and ongoing intent to access City documents | City contends Price lacks injury-in-fact and no real/imminent threat of future injury | Dismissal for lack of standing (without prejudice); Price failed to allege imminent future injury |
| Applicability of Title III website standing principles to Title II claims | Title III standards should govern website claims generally | Title III (Houston) factors inapposite because Title II does not require nexus to a physical place | Court rejects wholesale reliance on Title III; develops Title II-specific factors |
| Whether a tester satisfies injury-in-fact in Title II website suits | Testers discover violations and thus have injury-in-fact | City argues discovery alone is insufficient without future harm | Court accepts that a tester can satisfy injury-in-fact but still must plead imminent future injury |
| Sufficiency of pleading inaccessible content and concrete future plans | Price asserts general inability to access documents and an intent to read weekly | City argues Price failed to identify specific inaccessible materials or concrete plans to use City services | Court finds allegations too vague/conclusory on which documents are inaccessible and on future intent; weighs against standing |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires concrete, particularized injury and imminent threat of future harm)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element of standing)
- Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir.) (Title II standing and future-injury principles; plaintiffs must show intent to return to government facility)
- Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir.) (articulated four Houston factors applied in Title III website standing analysis)
- Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir.) (testers have standing under the ADA; adopted in reasoning by Eleventh Circuit)
- Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.) (Title III requires nexus between intangible barrier and physical place of public accommodation)
- McCullum v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir.) (affirmed lack of standing where plaintiffs failed to show intent to return to facility)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (statutory rights can give rise to injury-in-fact for testers)