Preuss v. United States, 5:23-cv-00310

Multiple plaintiffs, all veterans, brought negligence claims against the United States arising out of healthcare services provided by Dr. Jonathan Yates at the Beckley VA Medical Center (BVAMC) between April 2018 and July 2019.
Plaintiffs alleged Dr. Yates performed acupuncture without proper credentials and failed to follow sanitary procedures, and the government was negligent in hiring, training, supervising, and retaining him.
Many plaintiffs (the "Release Plaintiffs") previously filed and settled separate lawsuits based on substandard medical care by Dr. Yates at BVAMC, executing broad release agreements in connection with those settlements.
The new suits sought to recover for harms related specifically to acupuncture, arguing they weren’t aware of certain facts (e.g., uncredentialed acupuncture) at the time of the initial settlements.
The government moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing claim preclusion (res judicata) and that the release agreements were broad enough to bar these new claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Scope of Release Agreements	Releases didn’t cover unknown, later-discovered acupuncture claims; "subject matter" is ambiguous	Releases cover all claims arising from Dr. Yates’ care at BVAMC, regardless of whether claims were known or unknown	The releases are broad, unambiguous, bar all claims—even unknown—related to Dr. Yates’ BVAMC care
Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion	New claims are distinct; prior actions focused on different injuries and legal theories	Same parties, same core operative facts; claims could have been brought earlier; final judgment exists	Preclusion applies; all factors satisfied, so claims are barred
Knowledge/Lack of Discovery	Plaintiffs didn’t know about the acupuncture issues until after settlement; government concealed facts	Lack of knowledge doesn’t matter; public info available; fraud/concealment exception doesn’t apply	No concealment by U.S.; due diligence required before settlement—claims remain barred
General vs. Specific Release	Because word "general" isn’t used in the agreements, they’re not a general release	Language is broad, must be read as a general release—covers every claim relating to Dr. Yates’ care	Agreements are general releases, bar these claims

Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (explaining the preclusive effect and rationales for res judicata)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard: nonmovant must show disputed material fact)
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (summary judgment evidentiary standards; inferences must favor nonmovant)
Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2008) (scope and purposes of claim preclusion)
Kenny v. Quigg, 820 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1987) (dismissal with prejudice as adjudication on the merits for res judicata)
Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1986) (when fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation might avoid preclusion—must be proven)
Virginia Impression Prods. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1971) (nature and scope of general releases)