2016 Ohio 4859
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- Preterm-Cleveland, an Ohio licensed ambulatory surgical facility providing abortions, sued state officials challenging provisions of the 2014-2015 Ohio budget bill (HB 59) as violating the Ohio Constitution one-subject rule.
- Preterm identified three contested provisions: the "heartbeat" provisions (mandatory fetal heartbeat determination, disclosure, waiting period, and related civil/criminal/disciplinary consequences), written transfer-agreement requirements for ASFs, and parenting/pregnancy program restrictions.
- At the trial-court level defendants moved to dismiss/for summary judgment for lack of standing; the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on standing and granted partial summary judgment to the prosecutor on some noncriminal provisions; it did not reach the one-subject-rule merits.
- On appeal the Eighth District reversed as to standing, holding Preterm had sufficiently alleged a concrete, particularized injury (procedural/policy changes, recordkeeping, scheduling burdens, and threat of liability) and was a direct target of at least some HB 59 provisions.
- The appellate court remanded for further proceedings on the merits; one judge dissented, arguing Preterm’s claimed harms were speculative, largely suffered by physicians or patients (not the clinic), and thus insufficient for standing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Preterm has standing to challenge HB 59 | Preterm: changed policies, new forms, extra recordkeeping, scheduling burdens, and risk of civil/criminal/disciplinary sanctions show concrete, redressable injury; ASF is targeted | Defendants: alleged harms are speculative, fall on physicians or patients (third parties), or are not sufficiently concrete or imminent | Court: Preterm has standing; injuries are concrete/particularized and it is a direct target of the provisions (reversed trial court on standing) |
| Whether "heartbeat" provisions injure the clinic | Preterm: heartbeat rules force policy changes, additional counseling and visits, staff scheduling burdens, exposure to liability—clinic is necessarily targeted | Defendants: statutory duties fall on the person performing the abortion (physician), not the corporate clinic; clinic’s claimed burdens are speculative or self-imposed | Court: clinic sufficiently showed concrete changes and risk of enforcement; heartbeat provisions target the clinic as part of the abortion service site; supports standing |
| Whether "written transfer agreement" provisions cause injury | Preterm: new biennial update/filing and limits on hospitals reduce contracting options and add administrative burden | Defendants: Preterm already had a renewable agreement with a private hospital; new requirements mirror prior regulation and caused no additional concrete burden | Court: viewed Preterm’s affidavits and procedural changes as sufficient to allege an injury for standing purposes; standing sustained |
| Whether court should decide merits (one-subject challenge) | Preterm: merits ripe and should be decided after standing determined | Defendants: trial court determined lack of standing so merits unaddressed | Court: reversed only on standing and remanded; did not decide one-subject-rule merits |
Key Cases Cited
- ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St.3d 520 (party must show injury fairly traceable to defendant and redressable)
- Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55 (standing requires injury fairly traceable and redressable)
- State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451 (private challengers must show direct, concrete injury different from public generally)
- Clifton v. Blanchester, 131 Ohio St.3d 287 (object of challenged action ordinarily shows causation and redressability)
- Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994 (industry-targeting statutes make participants likely proper plaintiffs)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (concrete injury requirement explained for Article III standing)