42 Cal.App.5th 148
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- Presbyterian Camp and Conference Centers (PCCC) operated a camp in Santa Barbara County; employee Charles Cook removed a burning log from a malfunctioning cabin chimney and carried it across dry vegetation, igniting the Sherpa Fire.
- The Sherpa Fire burned about 7,500 acres; CalFire spent over $12 million suppressing the fire and investigating its cause.
- CalFire's investigation found negligence by both Cook and PCCC (failure to clear vegetation, maintain the chimney, and maintain fire safety devices) and sued Cook and PCCC under Health & Safety Code §§ 13009 and 13009.1 to recover suppression and investigation costs.
- PCCC demurred, relying on Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell, which held that §§ 13009/13009.1 do not permit vicarious corporate liability for employees’ negligent acts.
- The trial court overruled the demurrer; PCCC sought writ review. The appellate court rejected Howell’s reasoning and held §§ 13009 and 13009.1 permit vicarious corporate liability, denying the writ.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §§13009 and 13009.1 permit vicarious corporate liability for an employee’s negligent or unlawful acts causing a fire | Statutes allow recovery from a “person” (which includes corporations); corporations act through agents so vicarious liability follows | Howell and PCCC: the statutes do not authorize vicarious corporate liability | Court: Yes; §§13009 and 13009.1 permit corporate vicarious liability when an employee negligently or unlawfully starts or allows a fire within scope of employment |
| Whether the term “person” in §§13009/13009.1 excludes corporations | CalFire: §19 defines “person” to include corporations; that definition applies unless context requires otherwise | PCCC: the statutory scheme and context show statutes target natural persons | Court: §19 applies and the context and history support treating corporations as “persons” under these provisions |
| Whether the omission of “personally or through another” from §§13009/13009.1 (but its presence in §13007) shows legislative intent to preclude vicarious liability | CalFire: legislative history and prior case law show vicarious liability historically applied; 1971 amendments targeted other issues, not vicarious liability | PCCC/Howell: omission is a signal the Legislature intended to remove vicarious liability | Court: Rejected Howell’s inference; legislative history does not show intent to eliminate vicarious liability and prior interpretations of like language support vicarious liability |
| Whether permitting vicarious liability would render other statutory language surplusage (e.g., §13007 phrasing; subdivisions (a)(2)/(a)(3)) | CalFire: different subdivisions address distinct conduct; allowing vicarious liability does not make other provisions meaningless | PCCC: allowing vicarious liability makes §13007 language and other subdivisions redundant | Court: Surplusage concern insufficient; plain text and history control and subdivisions serve different purposes |
Key Cases Cited
- Snukal v. Flightways Mfg., Inc., 23 Cal.4th 754 (recognizing that corporations act through agents)
- Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell, 18 Cal.App.5th 154 (contrary appellate decision holding §§13009/13009.1 do not permit vicarious corporate liability)
- Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal.3d 962 (employer vicarious liability principles)
- Haverstick v. Southern Pac. Co., 1 Cal.App.2d 605 (railroad vicarious liability under early Fire Liability Law)
- County of Ventura v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 85 Cal.App.2d 529 (utility liable for firefighting costs)
- Golden v. Conway, 55 Cal.App.3d 948 (application of fire statutes to non-owner actors)
- Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal.3d 202 (noting vicarious liability is a deeply rooted principle)