562 U.S. 115
U.S.2011Background
- Moore participated in kidnapping and killing Kenneth Rogers in Oregon on December 7, 1995.
- Moore admitted to a two-witness confession and outlined the events leading to the shooting.
- Moore pleaded no contest to felony murder pursuant to a plea offer for a 300-month sentence after defense counsel discussed suppression options.
- Moore challenged his conviction via state postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for not seeking suppression of his police confession before the plea.
- Oregon postconviction court found suppression would have been futile and denied relief; Ninth Circuit reversed, holding error under Strickland and AEDPA.
- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding the state court’s Strickland analysis reasonably applied governing law under AEDPA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was counsel’s failure to seek suppression of the police confession prejudicial? | Moore asserts counsel’s omission caused prejudice by undermining the plea bargain. | State contends suppression would have been futile and thus not prejudicial under Strickland. | No unreasonable prejudice; decision allowed by Strickland and AEDPA. |
| Does Fulminante govern prejudice review for a plea deal? | Moore argues Fulminante dictates prejudice analysis for suppression in plea context. | State argues Fulminante is inapplicable to Strickland prejudice in pleabargain cases. | Fulminante does not govern the Strickland prejudice inquiry in plea contexts. |
| Was the state court’s application of Strickland under AEDPA unreasonable? | Moore claims the state court unreasonably applied Strickland by discounting counsel’s strategic reasoning. | State maintains the state court reasonably applied Strickland with deference to counsel’s judgment. | No; the state court’s application was reasonable under AEDPA. |
| Did the likelihood of trial outcomes justify the plea under Hill v. Lockhart? | Moore contends but-for counsel’s errors, he would have gone to trial rather than plead. | State argues the plea was a reasonable strategic choice given evidence and risk of capital exposure. | Moore failed to show a reasonable probability of different outcome; Hill standard not satisfied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court 1984) (two-prong standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (Supreme Court 2009) (high deferential bar for habeas review of Strickland)
- Richter v. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. 770 (Supreme Court 2011) (AEDPA deference with Strickland framework)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (Supreme Court 1985) (prejudice standard for guilty-plea withdrawals)
- Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. 279 (Supreme Court 1991) (prejudice inquiry for involuntary confessions)
- Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (Supreme Court 1986) (post-conviction review deference limits on additional grounds)
- Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (Supreme Court 2004) (AEDPA applies with broader leeway for reasonableness in general standards)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court 1999) (harmless-error standard in prejudice analysis)
- Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (Supreme Court 2002) (deference to counsel’s strategy under Strickland)