Premier Physicians Group, PLLC v. Navarro
240 Ariz. 193
| Ariz. | 2016Background
- Premier Physicians treated Mandy Gipson for car-accident injuries between June and October 2011 and later recorded a medical lien on Sept. 16, 2011 for ~ $12,000.
- Gipson settled with the insurer in March 2013 but did not pay Premier; Premier sued the Navarros in Jan. 2014 under A.R.S. § 33-934 to enforce its lien.
- The Navarros moved to dismiss, arguing Premier’s lien was untimely because it was recorded more than 30 days after services first began.
- Trial court dismissed Premier’s complaint; the court of appeals reversed, adopting a “rolling” 30-day rule that permitted recovery for charges within 30 days before recording and thereafter.
- Arizona Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether § 33-932(A)’s deadline is measured from the first day of services or from the last (or a rolling 30-day window).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When must a non-hospital health-care provider record a lien under A.R.S. § 33-932(A)? | Premier: lien may be recorded within 30 days after final service (allowing recovery for charges within 30 days before recording and future charges). | Navarros: lien must be recorded before or within 30 days after the patient first receives any services. | Held: lien must be recorded before or within 30 days after first providing services; Premier’s lien was untimely. |
| Does § 33-932(A) create a rolling 30-day window like mechanic’s liens? | Premier: statute should be read like mechanic’s lien scheme, allowing retroactive recovery for 30 days prior to filing. | Navarros: medical-lien statute differs; no rolling window. | Held: statute contains a fixed trigger (first services) and does not create a rolling deadline. |
| Does interpreting § 33-932(A) to allow filing after final services collapse the statutory hospital/non-hospital distinction? | Premier: not applicable; similar timing is permissible. | Navarros: would render hospital exception superfluous by making deadlines effectively identical. | Held: the hospital exception shows the legislature intended different deadlines; reading in favor of first-services preserves that distinction. |
| Are appellate attorney-fee awards to Premier appropriate where Premier is not prevailing party? | Premier: court of appeals awarded fees as prevailing party on appeal. | Navarros: fees should be reversed and awarded to them as prevailing parties because dismissal stands. | Held: vacated appellate award to Premier; reversed and awarded reasonable fees/costs to Navarros in this Court. |
Key Cases Cited
- Blankenbaker v. Jonovich, 205 Ariz. 383 (2003) (describing statutory medical-lien remedy and its purpose)
- Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 166 Ariz. 514 (App. 1990) (liens are remedial but recording requirements must be strictly followed)
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (plainness or ambiguity of statutory language assessed in context)
- Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384 (2014) (cardinal rule: give effect to every clause and word of a statute)