493 P.3d 400
N.M. Ct. App.2020Background
- Herbert and Marie Welch owned the disputed mineral interests (the Minerals) as joint tenants; Herbert died and a joint 1974 Will purported to give Herbert’s community share to Marie and (by paragraph) to Joe H. Welch and Grace Phelan on the survivor’s division.
- A 1975 probate proceeding adjudicated Herbert’s estate, finding Marie the sole beneficiary and ordering distribution of Herbert’s property to Marie; Marie executed a mineral deed to herself based on that decree.
- Marie later executed a 1980 will (the 1980 Will) devising mineral interests: 1/4 to Joe H. Welch (per stirpes if predeceased) and other mineral rights to Ralph S. Griffin and Samuel Alderman; Alderman kept possession of the original will and moved to Florida.
- Marie died in 1988; no one probated the 1980 Will within three years. In 2007 Griffin filed an heirship proceeding by publication, the court found Marie died intestate and declared Griffin sole heir; Griffin obtained the Minerals and later sold interests that ultimately were acquired by Premier Oil & Gas, Inc.
- In 2012 Alderman sought probate of the 1980 Will, leading to litigation; the district court granted summary judgment to Griffin and Premier (quieting title and finding Premier a bona fide purchaser). The Welches appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Welches) | Defendant's Argument (Griffin/Premier) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1974 Will created vested future interests in favor of Joe H. Welch and Grace Phelan that survived the 1975 probate | The 1974 Will was a contractual will giving Marie a life estate and vesting remainders in Joe H. Welch and Grace Phelan | The 1975 final probate decree adjudicated and vested Herbert’s property in Marie; that decree is final and binding | Held for defendants as to 1974 Will: 1975 probate decree conclusively vested Herbert’s property in Marie; Welches’ claim to vested remainders fails |
| Whether the 2007 heirship judgment (finding intestacy and awarding Minerals to Griffin) is void for lack of notice/due process | Griffin failed to exercise reasonable diligence to locate known devisees (Alderman and the 1980 Will) and thus publication-only notice was defective; judgment is void as to the Welches | Griffin argued publication was proper and the Welches were not known devisees; final judgment presumed valid | Held for Welches: 2007 judgment is subject to collateral attack and void as to the Welches because Griffin did not exercise required reasonable diligence before resorting to publication |
| Whether statutes-of-limitations under the probate code (three-year bar) prevent probate or use of the 1980 Will now | The Welches may probate the 1980 Will because exceptions to the three-year rule permit late probate to confirm title where no prior valid proceedings were commenced within three years | Griffin/Premier argued the three-year statutory presumption of intestacy bars the will and earlier law extinguished the right | Held for Welches on this point: the probate-code exceptions (as currently codified) permit probate to confirm title where no prior valid proceeding occurred within three years; district court erred to the extent it applied the old statute to bar the 1980 Will |
| Whether Premier is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and thus protected | Welches: title opinion language and the 1974/1975 materials should have put Premier on inquiry/constructive notice of defects | Premier: obtained a title opinion, examined records, was unaware of any probated will contest, and had no actual/inquiry notice of defects in Griffin’s chain | Held for Premier: Premier is a bona fide purchaser; its reliance on the public records and the unchallenged 2007 decree was reasonable, so Premier is protected |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Conley’s Will, 276 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1954) (probate courts have jurisdiction to determine distribution and title in estate proceedings)
- In re Estate of Baca, 621 P.2d 511 (N.M. 1980) (presumption in favor of jurisdiction; collateral attack permitted if lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears)
- T.H. McElvain Oil & Gas Ltd. P’ship v. Grp. I: Benson-Montin-Greer Drilling Corp., 388 P.3d 240 (N.M. 2017) (due diligence required to locate interested persons before resort to publication; inadequate service can void a judgment)
- Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (U.S. 1950) (constitutional standard: notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties)
- Jeffers v. Doel, 658 P.2d 426 (N.M. 1982) (elements of bona fide purchaser: value, good faith, lack of notice)
- City of Rio Rancho v. Amrep Sw. Inc., 260 P.3d 414 (N.M. 2011) (duty to inquire; a purchaser is charged with knowledge discoverable by reasonably diligent investigation)
- In re Estate of Yogiji, 311 P.3d 1224 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (narrow application of exceptions to the three-year bar: allows confirmation of title but not possessory control beyond that needed to confirm title)