Prelaz v. Town of Canton, 235 N.C. App. 147

Champion conveyed Camp Hope to the YMCA (fee simple determinable) and reserved a reversion to Champion if specified conditions were broken; the Town held a reversionary/third-party interest that would last only while the Town complied with enumerated conditions.
YMCA forfeited its interest and the Town acquired title in 1996; Champion’s successor (International Paper) assigned its reversionary interest to the Prelazes in 2006.
The Town leased the property to Wellspring, a for-profit weight-loss summer camp, which operated primarily May–Sept and drew campers from across the U.S.; only about 20 campers each year were from Haywood or adjoining counties.
Plaintiffs sued claiming a Deed clause (“the Town will not operate on the property a summer camp primarily for the benefit of residents of other areas and states”) was an express condition; they argued its breach triggered their reversionary title.
The Town contended the clause was precatory (advisory) and alternatively argued the lease’s local economic and program benefits meant no breach occurred.
The trial court submitted breach to the jury, which found no breach; on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed, holding as a matter of law the clause is precatory and cannot effect an automatic reverter.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the clause prohibiting a summer camp "primarily for the benefit of residents of other areas and states" is an express, enforceable condition that can trigger automatic reverter	The clause is an express condition; Wellspring’s out-of-area campers show the Town breached it, so plaintiffs’ reversion should be triggered	The clause is precatory/advisory (not an enforceable condition); therefore no automatic reverter can arise as a matter of law	Held: The clause is precatory as a matter of law and cannot trigger plaintiffs’ reversionary interest; directed verdict for Town should have been entered

Finkel v. Finkel, 162 N.C. App. 344 (N.C. Ct. App.) (prevailing party may appeal an unfavorable aspect of judgment)
Davis v. Dennis Lilly Co., 330 N.C. 314 (N.C.) (directed verdict standard: view evidence in light most favorable to non-movant)
Ange v. Ange, 235 N.C. 506 (N.C.) (language expressing motive/purpose is precatory, not a condition)
Washington City Bd. of Educ. v. Edgerton, 244 N.C. 576 (N.C.) (courts disfavor construing deed language as a condition subsequent absent clear intent)
Station Assocs., Inc. v. Dare Cnty., 350 N.C. 367 (N.C.) (reverter requires express, unambiguous language of termination upon condition broken)