Prather v. AT&T, Inc., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2092

Relator John C. Prather, a long‑time state prosecutor who supervised hundreds of wiretaps, sued major telecom companies under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging they overcharged the federal government for electronic surveillance after CALEA upgrades.
Prather alleges CALEA-funded upgrades reduced labor for intercepts but carriers increased intercept charges substantially; he relied on rate sheets, a few invoices, professional experience, and conversations with carrier representatives.
In 2004 Prather provided affidavits (prepared during work hours and at the direction of NYOAG staff) to the FCC as part of New York Attorney General comments responding to an FCC inquiry about intercept costs.
The United States declined to intervene; defendants moved to dismiss under the FCA public disclosure bar. The district court allowed limited discovery on original‑source status, then dismissed the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction, concluding Prather was not an original source.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed: it held the 2010 FCA amendments do not apply retroactively and that Prather failed both prongs of the pre‑2010 original‑source test—he lacked direct, independent knowledge and his disclosures were not voluntary.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2010 FCA amendments to the public‑disclosure bar apply	Prather: amendments are jurisdictional and should apply so defendants must plead public disclosure as an affirmative defense	Defendants: pre‑2010 law governs pending cases	Court: 2010 amendments are not retroactive; pre‑2010 law applies
Whether Prather had "direct and independent knowledge" (original source prong 1)	Prather: firsthand experience with wiretaps, rate sheets, budgets, and conversations gave him direct knowledge that carriers overcharged	Defendants: his information was speculative, lacked carrier cost data, and amounted to inference, not firsthand knowledge	Court: Held lack of direct, independent knowledge; allegations speculative and inferential
Whether Prather "voluntarily provided" information to the government (original source prong 2)	Prather: his FCC affidavits were voluntary and not part of his ordinary duties; he pushed for inclusion of overcharge allegations	Defendants: disclosures were made in his official capacity at NYOAG’s request during work hours	Court: Held disclosures were not voluntary—submitted at employer’s request, during work, on work computer, while paid
Jurisdiction over supplemental state‑law claims after dismissal of federal claim	Prather: (implicitly) state claims should proceed	Defendants: federal dismissal moots supplemental jurisdiction	Court: Declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed state claims

Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280 (2010) (2010 FCA amendments not retroactive)
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007) (original‑source requirement was jurisdictional pre‑2010)
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997) (analysis of retroactivity for jurisdictional amendments affecting substantive rights)
United States ex rel. Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. en banc 2015) (pre‑2010 vs post‑2010 original‑source definitions; interpretive guidance)
United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 161 F.3d 533 (9th Cir. 1998) (government employee disclosures may be non‑voluntary and not entitled to qui tam windfall)
Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 1995) (government employee disclosures for pay/duty are not "voluntary" under FCA)