Powell v. Tompkins, 926 F. Supp. 2d 367

Powell was convicted at a January 30, 2009 bench trial in Boston Municipal Court of possession of a firearm without an FID card, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, resisting arrest, and carrying a firearm without a license; he was sentenced to 18 months and three years’ probation.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed all convictions in 2011, and Powell’s petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied in 2012, after which Powell filed this federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Powell challenges (1) the weight of the Massachusetts presumption that a defendant is unlicensed absent proof of a license, (2) trial counsel’s failure to suppress a custodial statement, and (3) the age-based licensure restriction (age 21) for obtaining a firearms license.
AEDPA governs review; the court defers to state court findings of fact and applies deference to state-law rulings, reviewing constitutional questions de novo where necessary.
Facts relevant to the issues include Powell’s pursuit after brandishing a revolver, his custodial statement that he did not have a firearm, and the licensing framework that makes license absence an element or defense depending on the language of ch. 278, §7.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Massachusetts 278, §7 presumption violates due process	Powell argues the presumption unconstitutionally shifts the burden.	Massachusetts courts treated it as a burden of production, not an element of the crime.	No due process violation; burden on production does not offend due process under AEDPA framework.
Whether the licensing scheme violates the Second Amendment	Powell contends the 7 presumption and §131(d)(iv) infringe the right to keep and bear arms for 18–20 year-olds.	Licensing is compatible with the Second Amendment as a reasonable, historical restriction.	Massachusetts’ age-based licensure passes intermediate scrutiny and does not unduly burden the right.
Standing to challenge age-based restrictions	Powell, age 18 at arrest, should have standing to challenge the licensing scheme.	Standing required actual application or futility, per state practice.	Powell has standing to challenge the license-to-carry provision (131(d)(iv)) but not to challenge the FID-card provision (129B).
Ineffective assistance of counsel claim	Failure to move to suppress custodial statement violated Saferian/Strickland.	Counsel’s decision was reasonable; suppression issue did not prejudice outcome.	No Sixth Amendment violation; trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable and the outcome unlikely to differ.

Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570 (U.S. 2008) (recognized limits on the Second Amendment and framework for regulation)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (U.S. 2010) (incorporation of Second Amendment to the states via Due Process)
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970) (due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element)
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (U.S. 1943) (statutory presumptions require rational connection and production convenience)
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (U.S. 1979) (distinguishes permissive vs mandatory presumptions)
Saferian v. Commonwealth, 366 Mass. 89 (Mass. 1974) (test for ineffective assistance in state postconviction review)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong the standard for ineffective assistance claims)
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (U.S. 1986) (counsel's failure to file suppression motion may be deficient but not per se ineffective)
Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 460 Mass. 723 (Mass. 2011) (application of licensing burden and related presumptions in Massachusetts)
National Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (age-based firearm restrictions and intermediate scrutiny)