Powell v. State, 307 Ga. 96

Background

In June 1993 Lionel Turner was shot and killed on a Dougherty County porch. Appellant Kenneth Powell and Donny Mimbs were later indicted for malice murder and related offenses; Powell was tried separately in November 1993.
Witnesses placed Powell in a group searching for Turner; Powell openly carried a gun, refused to put it away, led the group to Turner’s location, and acknowledged afterwards that he shot Turner.
Witnesses testified Mimbs grabbed the gun from Powell, fired multiple shots (including a fatal chest wound), Powell later took the gun and also fired (knee wound), and Mimbs struck Turner with a chair. The pathologist testified Turner bled to death from multiple gunshot wounds; the chest wound would have caused death within a minute.
The jury convicted Powell of malice murder and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. Post-trial motions and an extraordinary motion for new trial followed, with further proceedings culminating in this appeal decided in 2019.
Powell argued (1) insufficient evidence because Mimbs fired the fatal shot, (2) the trial court erred by not giving several jury charges sua sponte, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request several jury charges and a voluntary-manslaughter instruction. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Powell's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence for malice murder	Powell argues Mimbs alone caused Turner’s death; Powell’s knee shot was a minor contribution, so evidence is insufficient to convict Powell of murder as a principal or party.	Evidence shows a common enterprise: Powell carried a gun, refused to stow it, led the group, participated in the shooting, and expressed intent; thus a rational jury could find Powell a party to malice murder.	Affirmed — viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could find Powell guilty as a party to malice murder.
Trial court’s failure to give certain jury charges sua sponte (causation/proximate cause, jury vs. court roles, circumstantial evidence, venue)	Powell contends these omissions were legally erroneous and prejudicial.	The court’s overall charge covered the elements, parties law, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt; circumstantial-evidence and venue charges were not required absent request; the court’s language on jury/court roles was permissible when read in context.	No reversible error — charges were adequate as given; circumstantial-evidence and venue instructions were not required without request; no prejudicial failure to instruct on proximate causation.
Ineffective assistance — failure to request jury instructions (causation, court/jury roles, circumstantial evidence, venue, and instruction on defendant’s right not to testify)	Powell contends counsel was deficient for not requesting these charges; prejudice would have altered the outcome.	Even assuming deficiency for some omissions, the charge as a whole was adequate and the evidence of guilt was strong; there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome.	Denied — Powell failed to show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice for these claimed omissions.
Ineffective assistance — failure to request voluntary manslaughter instruction	Powell argues provocation or circumstances (e.g., Mimbs snatching the gun) could support manslaughter.	The provocation alleged (prior fight 30–40 minutes earlier and the subsequent struggle) did not meet the legal standard for sudden and irresistible passion in a reasonable person; no evidentiary support for the lesser charge.	Denied — no reasonable basis in the evidence to request voluntary manslaughter; counsel not deficient for omitting unsupported charge.

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency review)
Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568 (conviction as party requires shared criminal intent)
Navarrete v. State, 283 Ga. 156 (criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship, conduct)
Whiting v. State, 296 Ga. 429 (no sua sponte proximate-cause instruction required where charge as a whole suffices)
Flournoy v. State, 294 Ga. 741 (same principle re: proximate causation instruction)
Sumlin v. State, 283 Ga. 264 (circumstantial-evidence instruction required only if requested when both direct and circumstantial evidence presented)
Shahid v. State, 276 Ga. 543 (venue instruction not required sua sponte when venue proven and reasonable-doubt charge given)
Bryson v. Jackson, 299 Ga. 751 (counsel not ineffective for failing to request a manslaughter charge unsupported by the evidence)
Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743 (party conviction may stand even if companion fired the fatal shot when acting in common enterprise)