320 P.3d 1076
Utah Ct. App.2014Background
- In June 2001 Black Diamond (with others) offered to dedicate a 30-foot portion of a 78-foot easement crossing Powder Run’s property to Park City; the City adopted an ordinance accepting the dedication on June 27, 2001.
- Black Diamond built a road, installed utilities, and placed a monument sign on the easement; the public has used the road since late 2001.
- Over nine years later (Sept. 15, 2010) Powder Run sued the City and Black Diamond seeking quiet title and a declaration that the dedication/ordinance was void ab initio.
- Defendants moved to dismiss/for summary judgment based on the 30-day MLUDMA statute of limitations (Utah Code § 10-9a-801); the district court granted relief for defendants and denied Powder Run’s motion to amend as futile.
- On appeal Powder Run argued the statutory time bar did not apply (statute inapplicable; void-ordinance exception; true quiet-title exception; actual possession exception). The appeals court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of MLUDMA 30-day limit | Statute doesn’t apply because Powder Run seeks to quiet title (not "review" the City's decision); Black Diamond lacked authority to dedicate so no dedication occurred | Ordinance is a municipal land-use decision and Powder Run seeks relief that reviews/undoes that decision, so MLUDMA applies | MLUDMA §10-9a-801 applies; Powder Run’s complaint is a challenge to the City’s land-use decision and is time-barred |
| Void-ordinance exception | Void ordinances are not subject to time bars (analogy to void judgments) | Even if an ordinance is claimed void, §10-9a-801 governs challenges and imposes the time limit and standards of review | Claim that an ordinance is void does not avoid §10-9a-801; the statute contemplates and limits such challenges |
| True quiet-title exception (no SOL) | This is a true quiet-title action (like a claim against a "wild deed") so statute of limitations should not apply | Quiet-title relief here depends on invalidating the ordinance; thus the MLUDMA limitations govern | Not a true quiet-title case: success depends on first invalidating the ordinance, so the 30-day limit applies |
| Actual possession exception | Powder Run is in actual possession under a claim of ownership, so SOL inapplicable | Black Diamond and the public have occupied and used the dedicated strip since 2001; Powder Run lacked undisturbed possession and had notice | Powder Run is not in actual possession of the dedicated portion; the actual-possession exception does not apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Gillmor v. Summit County, 246 P.3d 102 (Utah 2010) (interpreting MLUDMA/CLUDMA 30-day review provision)
- Bangerter v. Petty, 225 P.3d 874 (Utah 2009) (true quiet-title rule and limitations)
- In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 144 P.3d 1129 (Utah 2006) (true quiet-title exception where no other legal issue required)
- Branting v. Salt Lake City, 153 P. 995 (Utah 1915) (statute of limitations applies to suits asking courts to annul municipal proceedings)
- Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 81 P.2d 374 (Utah 1938) (quiet title dependent on cancelling deed; SOL applies)
- Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., 659 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1983) (plaintiff must prevail on strength of own title in quiet-title action)
- Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986) (authority on void judgments and time limitations)