Poventud v. City of New York, 715 F.3d 57

Poventud was convicted in 1998 of attempted murder, first-degree armed robbery, first-degree assault, and weapon possession and sentenced to 10–20 years.
His conviction was later vacated in New York for Brady violations; he was released and, in 2006, pled guilty to a lesser charge with a one-year sentence due to time served.
In 2007 Poventud filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Brady violations caused him to be denied a fair trial; the suit was stayed in state court proceedings and later resumed.
The district court granted summary judgment, holding that Poventud’s § 1983 claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey because they would imply invalidity of a conviction.
The Second Circuit held that because Poventud was no longer in custody, Heck’s favorable-termination bar does not apply to § 1983 claims and vacated remanding for further proceedings.
The court noted that Poventud’s § 1983 claims concern a Brady violation and are not tied to overturning his current conviction, which could be pursued independently.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Heck bars § 1983 claims when plaintiff is not in custody	Poventud should be able to pursue § 1983 relief since habeas is unavailable.	Heck bars claims if they would imply invalidity of an existing conviction, regardless of custody status.	Heck does not bar § 1983 claims for a plaintiff not in custody.
Whether the Spencer/Justice Souter dicta create a circuit-wide exception	Spencer dicta allow a former prisoner to pursue § 1983 without favorable termination.	Spencer dicta cannot override Heck’s binding rule; no exception applies here.	Jenkins/Leather/Green/Huang line of precedents controls; § 1983 relief is available where habeas is not available.
Whether Poventud’s guilty plea defeats or interacts with potential § 1983 relief	Poventud’s plea does not bar a separate § 1983 claim for Brady violations.	A conviction or plea necessarily undermines the § 1983 claim if it would imply invalidity of the conviction.	Poventud’s plea does not automatically bar a § 1983 claim; the claim concerns the Brady violation itself.
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment under Heck	Heck is inapplicable because Poventud is not in custody and may pursue § 1983 relief.	Heck applies to bar § 1983 where a favorable termination would be implicit.	Summary judgment based on Heck was improper; the case should be remanded for further proceedings.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1994) (favorable-termination requirement for § 1983 realted to convictions)
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1998) ( dicta on former prisoners not in custody may pursue § 1983)
Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999) ( Heck exception applied to disciplinary sanctions and not strictly to convictions)
Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420 (2d Cir. 1999) (pre-Hell: Heck not bar for arrestee not in custody; favors § 1983 claim)
Green v. Montgomery, 219 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2000) (Heck acts only to bar § 1983 if habeas remedy is available)
Huang ex rel. Yu v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirms Spencer dicta as basis for allowing § 1983 claims when habeas not available)
Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1986) (outstanding conviction bars § 1983 false arrest claims)
Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850 (2d Cir. 1992) (bar on § 1983 when success would defeat underlying conviction)
Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980) (avoidance of collateral attacks on outstanding convictions)