Postaski v. State
203 So. 3d 967
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Michelle Lee Postaski was convicted by a jury of armed burglary and two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm causing great bodily harm.
- The information and written judgment reclassified the offenses under Fla. Stat. § 775.087(1) based on a firearm enhancement, elevating burglary to a life felony and batteries to first-degree felonies.
- It was undisputed at trial that Postaski did not possess or use the firearm; only her codefendant possessed and used the weapon during the offenses.
- The State conceded that vicarious enhancement under section 775.087(1) was improper when the defendant did not personally possess the weapon.
- The trial court referenced Postaski’s lack of remorse at sentencing; Postaski argued this was an improper sentencing consideration.
- The appellate court affirmed the convictions but reversed the written judgment and sentences, remanding for correction of offense classifications and resentencing before a different judge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether offenses could be reclassified under § 775.087(1) based on a codefendant's firearm use | Postaski argued reclassification improper because she did not personally possess or use the firearm | State argued enhancement applied to reclassify offenses as charged | Reclassification under § 775.087(1) invalid as to Postaski; burglary must remain first‑degree felony and batteries second‑degree felonies (no vicarious enhancement) |
| Whether sentencing was improper and requires resentencing before a different judge | Postaski argued the court improperly considered her lack of remorse, warranting resentencing by a different judge | State conceded the sentencing error | Sentences vacated; resentencing required before a different judge because lack of remorse is an improper factor |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Rodriguez, 602 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1992) (section 775.087(1) enhancement requires personal possession of the weapon)
- Porter v. State, 737 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (recognizing Rodriguez and rejecting vicarious enhancement)
- Chase v. State, 74 So. 3d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversal where only codefendant possessed and used the weapon)
- Harris v. State, 766 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (use of weapon is an element of armed burglary under the statute)
- Pehlke v. State, 189 So. 3d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (trial court committed fundamental error by considering lack of remorse; resentencing before different judge required)
- Williams v. State, 164 So. 3d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (trial court may not consider assertions of innocence or failure to show remorse at sentencing)