Portz v. St. Cloud State University, 196 F. Supp. 3d 963

Background

Five female student-athletes on St. Cloud State University (SCSU) women’s tennis team sued after SCSU announced cuts to several varsity teams to address declining enrollment and revenue, including elimination of the women’s tennis team. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to preserve the tennis team while the case proceeds.
SCSU projects athletics participation of 254 women and 252 men for 2016–17 after cuts, arguing this will achieve Title IX proportionality with a nearly 50/50 student body; plaintiffs challenge the accuracy of SCSU’s counting and roster projections.
Plaintiffs present evidence that roster growth (notably in women’s indoor/outdoor track) may be unrealistic due to limited student demand and potential double-counting of multi-season athletes, and that some published roster numbers differ from SCSU’s internal figures.
Plaintiffs allege Title IX and Equal Protection Clause (via § 1983) violations and seek injunctive and declaratory relief; their requested preliminary injunction was narrowed to enjoin elimination of the women’s tennis team and related harms.
The district court found plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm (loss of a season and denial of rights), that the balance of harms and public interest favored plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs have a fair chance of success on the merits of their Title IX claim—granting a preliminary injunction preserving the women’s tennis program.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Title IX (Prong 1 proportionality)	SCSU will not actually reach 254 female participation opportunities; roster increases (esp. track) are unrealistic and SCSU may double-count athletes, so post-cut ratio will not be substantially proportionate to the student body.	SCSU will have 254 women and 252 men after reorganization, achieving near parity and compliance with Title IX.	Court: Plaintiffs have a fair chance of prevailing on Title IX because (1) roster growth and recruitment projections are uncertain and may be inflated, and (2) possible impermissible double-counting of athletes could reduce real female opportunities.
Irreparable harm	Loss of at least one season of varsity competition and denial of statutory/constitutional rights cannot be remedied by money; transferring is costly and impracticable for many plaintiffs.	Plaintiffs can transfer and continue to play elsewhere; loss is not irreparable.	Court: Plaintiffs face irreparable harm from losing the season and from prospective denial of rights; factor favors injunction.
Balance of harms / burden on university	Maintaining status quo for one year imposes little cost; SCSU will continue scholarships and may even lose revenue by cutting the team.	Injunction will disrupt SCSU’s reorganization, impose administrative and financial burdens, and interfere with legitimate budgeting decisions.	Court: Balance favors plaintiffs because maintaining the team for one year is unlikely to be costly and prevents irreparable injury.
Equal Protection (§ 1983)	Plaintiffs argue cuts discriminate on basis of sex.	SCSU asserts no intent to discriminate on basis of sex; actions are budget-driven; sovereign-immunity defenses may apply.	Court: Plaintiffs have not shown a fair chance of proving discriminatory intent; equal protection claim unlikely to succeed at this stage.

Key Cases Cited

Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277 (D. Conn. 2009) (loss of athletic opportunity is irreparable; preliminary injunction reasoning)
Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming findings about athletics participation counting and irreparable harm)
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (four-factor preliminary injunction framework)
Grasso Enters., LLC v. Express Scripts, Inc., 809 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2016) (application of Dataphase factors)
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (guidepost for unacceptable proportionality deviations under Title IX)
Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000) (use of percentage-point deviations as Title IX guidepost)
Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011) (small deviations can still satisfy Prong 1; contextual analysis)
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (loss of constitutional rights constitutes irreparable injury)
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (unequal treatment as injury-in-fact)
Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (Title IX enforcement and remedies)