Portland Regional Chamber of Commerce v. City of Portland
2021 ME 34
| Me. | 2021Background
- In July 2020 Portland voters circulated and qualified a direct-initiative ordinance amending the city's minimum wage: phased increases plus an "emergency" multiplier making the wage 1.5× the regular rate during a declared emergency.
- Voters approved the initiative at the November 3, 2020 municipal election; official results were released November 6, 2020.
- The City announced it would not enforce the emergency provision until January 1, 2022.
- On December 1, 2020 the Portland Regional Chamber of Commerce and local businesses sued, challenging the initiative as beyond "municipal affairs" under the Maine Constitution and the Portland City Code; two Whole Foods employees intervened and sought a declaration that the emergency rate was effective in December 2020.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the City, holding the emergency provision valid and effective January 1, 2022; the Chamber appealed and the intervenors cross-appealed the effective-date ruling.
- The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court: the emergency multiplier is a valid municipal initiative and its effective date is January 1, 2022.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity under Maine Constitution and Portland City Code (scope of "municipal affairs") | Chamber: initiative exceeds municipal affairs; home rule does not expand voters' initiative power | City: home rule and state municipal statute (§3001) allow municipalities (and thus voter initiatives) to legislate local minimum wages and related emergency provisions | Court: Valid — home rule and §3001 expand municipal legislative authority coextensive with direct initiative; the emergency multiplier is a municipal matter |
| Effective date of the emergency provision | Intervenors: ordinance effective upon certification/within 30 days after official results (Dec 2020); ballot context supports immediate effect | City & Chamber: plain ordinance language ties rates to dates in §33.7(b), the first of which is Jan 1, 2022 | Court: Held plain, unambiguous text cross-referencing subsection (b) fixes the effective date at Jan 1, 2022; §9-42 inapplicable |
Key Cases Cited
- Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec'y of State, [citation="237 A.3d 882"] (2020) (direct-initiative power should be liberally construed to facilitate participatory democracy)
- League of Women Voters v. Sec'y of State, [citation="683 A.2d 769"] (1996) (citizen initiatives carry a heavy presumption of constitutionality)
- Burkett v. Youngs, [citation="199 A. 619"] (1938) (municipal action required by state law is not a local affair subject to local referendum)
- Albert v. Town of Fairfield, [citation="597 A.2d 1353"] (1991) (municipal referendum valid where statutory grant left acceptance of ways to municipal discretion)
- Farris v. Goss, [citation="60 A.2d 908"] (1948) (historical context on the adoption of the initiative power)
- Sch. Comm. of Town of York v. Town of York, [citation="626 A.2d 935"] (1993) (test for whether a matter is fundamentally local or statewide)
- Fitanides v. City of Saco, [citation="113 A.3d 1088"] (2015) (ordinance interpretation: first determine whether text is plain and unambiguous)
- Jade Realty Corp. v. Town of Eliot, [citation="946 A.2d 408"] (2008) (when meaning is clear on its face, courts need not look beyond the text)
- Wawenock, LLC v. Dep't of Transp., [citation="187 A.3d 609"] (2018) (do not interpret ordinance text to produce illogical or absurd results)
