164 F. Supp. 3d 157
D. Me.2016Background
- South Portland enacted an ordinance banning the bulk loading of crude oil in Portland Harbor; its practical effect prevents Portland Pipe Line Corporation (PPLC) from reversing pipeline flow to export Canadian crude via the harbor.
- PPLC (and AWO) sued the City and its code enforcement officer seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging federal preemption (Pipeline Safety Act, Ports and Waterways Safety Act), foreign-affairs preemption, Commerce Clause, due process/equal protection, § 1983, and related Maine law claims.
- PPLC operates pipelines between South Portland and Montreal, holds submerged land leases and piers in the harbor, previously obtained Presidential permits and other approvals, and asserts market changes make north-to-south flow commercially necessary.
- The City drafted the ordinance after a failed 2013 citizen initiative aimed at “tar sands” crude; record shows the ordinance was designed to stop export of Canadian oil while styled around air-emissions and zoning concerns.
- The City moved under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing the case is unripe, plaintiffs lack standing, and any treaty-based claims are non-justiciable; PPLC argued ripeness and standing are satisfied because the ordinance is a present barrier that forces planning and economic harm.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ripeness (fitness & hardship) | PPLC: ordinance is a present, definitive barrier; removing it would remove the main obstacle and is fit for adjudication; withholding review imposes substantial hardship and a Catch-22. | City: Plaintiffs have no concrete plans to bulk-load; many contingent approvals (federal, state, local) make the dispute speculative and unfit; no present hardship. | Court: Denied dismissal — dispute is ripe. PPLC demonstrated intent and a direct, immediate dilemma; resolution would materially assist planning despite additional approvals possibly being required. |
| Standing | PPLC: owns the targeted infrastructure; ordinance causes concrete economic injury and blocks intended conduct; relief would redress injury. | City: Injury is speculative and based on future intentions; insufficient for Article III. | Court: PPLC has standing — concrete injury, causation, and redressability satisfied. |
| Advisory opinion / justiciability generally | PPLC: seeks concrete relief to remove an existing barrier; not advisory. | City: deciding now would be an advisory opinion because events are contingent. | Court: Not advisory; standing/ripeness analysis controls and supports jurisdiction. |
| Use of international treaties in preemption argument | PPLC: cites treaties to show federal regulatory scheme and federal interest, not to assert private treaty causes of action. | City: treaty-based rights create non-justiciable or non-enforceable private claims. | Court: Allowed consideration of treaties as background for preemption arguments; rejected dismissal of treaty claims at jurisdictional stage (not deciding merits). |
Key Cases Cited
- Town of Barnstable v. O’Connor, 786 F.3d 130 (1st Cir. 2015) (ripeness — fitness can be satisfied where invalidating an ordinance removes a barrier even if other approvals remain)
- City of Fall River v. FERC, 507 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (ripeness — decline to review where multiple significant agency approvals remained and agencies expressed serious reservations)
- Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (U.S. 1967) (ripeness framework: fitness and hardship factors)
- Weaver’s Cove Energy v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 589 F.3d 458 (1st Cir. 2009) (ripeness — case ripe where particular administrative barriers would cease to block the project and judicial relief would be useful)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing requires concrete and particularized injury, causation, and redressability)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (U.S. 2013) (standing — speculative future injury insufficient)
- Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530 (1st Cir. 1995) (ripeness caution: purely legal claims can still be unripe where anticipated events are too remote)