Porterfield v. Bruner Land Co., Inc.
103 N.E.3d 152
Ohio Ct. App.2017Background
- Consolidation Coal Company conveyed 160.987 acres to Bruner Land Co., Inc. in 1996; that deed excluded only "previously excepted and conveyed coal and mining rights."
- Bruner executed an internal "Bruner to Bruner" deed (Feb 1997) subdividing the tract and used the clause: "Excepting and Reserving to the former grantors, their heirs and assigns, all coal, oil, and gas."
- Parcels B-1 and B-2 were later conveyed (1997) with identical "excepting and reserving to the former grantors…" language; that clause recurred in subsequent deeds down to appellants (Porterfields).
- Porterfields sued to quiet title to oil and gas, arguing the reservation language was ineffective (because it referenced "former grantors") and thus oil and gas passed to them; Bruner claimed the language (as used in the Bruner→Hill and Bruner→Cooper deeds) reserved the oil, gas, and unreserved coal to Bruner.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for Bruner, finding the Bruner→Bruner deed did not reserve interests for Consolidation or Bruner, but that when the same language was used in the Bruner→Hill and Bruner→Cooper deeds it effectively reserved unreserved oil, gas, and coal to Bruner. The Seventh District affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Porterfield's Argument | Bruner's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the clause in the Bruner→Bruner deed reserved oil/gas/minerals to Bruner | Clause refers to "former grantors" (Consolidation) and thus cannot reserve to Bruner; reservation fails | Even if it couldn’t reserve Consolidation, the clause evidences intent and later deeds create reservation | The Bruner→Bruner deed did not reserve oil/gas to Consolidation or to Bruner; but this does not decide the case |
| Whether the identical clause in Bruner→Cooper and Bruner→Hill reserved oil/gas/minerals to Bruner | The phrase "former grantors" is ineffective to create a new reservation for Bruner (ambiguous/plural); extrinsic evidence would be required | Reading the deeds together, "former grantors" includes Bruner as a prior grantor; the later deeds therefore reserved unreserved oil/gas/coal to Bruner | The Bruner→Cooper and Bruner→Hill deeds, read with the chain of title, reserved oil/gas and unreserved coal to Bruner |
| Whether the court improperly relied on extrinsic evidence/chain of title at summary judgment | If ambiguous, parol evidence creates factual disputes for a jury; court improperly decided factual issue on summary judgment | The phrase is interpreted in context and the prior deeds are incorporated by reference (not extrinsic); no factual dispute bars summary judgment | Court properly consulted the chain of title (incorporated documents) and resolved the issue as a matter of law |
| Whether deed language is ambiguous and must be construed against drafter | Language is unambiguous and fails to reserve; alternatively, if ambiguous, construe against Bruner | Language is plain when read with other deeds and reserves to Bruner | Court found plain meaning (when read together) controlled; no need to apply secondary rule against drafter |
Key Cases Cited
- Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 (Ohio 2005) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St.2d 244 (Ohio 1974) (written instruments interpreted to carry out parties’ intent as evidenced by language)
- Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line, 53 Ohio St.2d 241 (Ohio 1978) (clear written terms must be given plain meaning)
- Illinois Controls, Inc. v. Langham, 70 Ohio St.3d 512 (Ohio 1994) (parol evidence may resolve ambiguity)
- Lighthorse v. Clinefelter, 36 Ohio App.3d 204 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (reservation cannot vest title in a stranger to the deed)
- Key Bank Natl. Assn. v. Columbus Campus, L.L.C., 988 N.E.2d 32 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (documents incorporated by reference must be read together)