Porter v. Warden (Habeas Corpus Order), 722 S.E.2d 534

Porter was convicted in Norfolk Circuit Court of capital murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and grand larceny, with a death sentence for capital murder and 22 years for the non-capital offenses, later affirmed on direct appeal.
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2009 challenging trial fairness, jury impartiality, Brady/Napue/Giglio claims, and ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Virginia Supreme Court granted a dismissal motion, holding the petition runnable but ultimately denying relief and dismissing the petition.
Specific claims include juror disclosure issues (Claim I), Brady/Napue/Giglio claims (Claim II), various ineffective assistance of counsel allegations (Claim III), and a general due process/biased judge argument (Claim IV).
The court applies McDonough two-part test for juror honesty, evaluates materiality of Brady evidence, and uses Strickland standard for ineffectiveness, ultimately denying relief on all asserted grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Juror T's non-disclosure of a family relation to law enforcement grounds for a new trial?	T failed to disclose his brother’s Chesapeake deputy status, allegedly biasing verdict.	No dishonest disclosure; defense did not elicit complete information; juror answered truthfully about his nephew only.	No merit; no material misrepresentation; McDonough test applied and not satisfied.
Do Brady/Napue/Giglio claims require relief for exculpatory evidence not disclosed?	Commonwealth failed to disclose favorable or impeaching evidence affecting guilt or punishment.	Several claims either barred as not cognizable or not material; no reasonable probability of different outcome.	Claims (II)(A)-(D) found without merit; some aspects barred; no Brady violation established.
Were counsel's trial/mitigation strategy decisions constitutionally deficient under Strickland?	Counsel failed to pursue multiple mitigating and evidentiary avenues (e.g., instructional requests, character/education evidence).	Counsel’s strategic decisions were reasonable and supported by the record.	Claims (III)(A)-(L) rejected; no deficient performance or prejudice shown.
Was the trial court biased or did preexisting bias justify habeas relief?	Judge’s preexisting prosecutorial bias violated due process.	No demonstrable bias; recusal motions were addressed; no structural error proven.	Claim IV barred as non-jurisdictional and not cognizable on habeas corpus.

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (U.S. 1984) (two-part test for juror impartiality and challenges for cause)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (U.S. 1985) (materiality of Brady evidence requires reasonable probability of different outcome)
Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458 (Va. 2007) (Napue standard for falsity and materiality in witness testimony)
Slayton v. Par rancan, 215 Va. 27 (Va. 1974) (habeas cognizability when issues are available on direct appeal)
Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 2002) (Brady never requiring disclosure of information available to defense)