Porter v. State, 148 A.3d 1

Background

Karla Porter was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder and related offenses for hiring Walter Bishop to kill her husband at the couple’s gas station on March 1, 2010; Porter solicited and coordinated the killing and supplied the firearm.
Porter’s defense was that she suffered from battered spouse syndrome (experts: Dr. Blumberg, Dr. Dutton) and acted out of actual (subjective) fear and impaired perception of imminence and options; State expert Dr. Siebert disputed PTSD and severe trauma.
At trial Porter testified to long-term physical, psychological, and escalating abuse and to prior attempts to solicit others to kill or poison her husband months before the homicide.
The trial court gave an imperfect self-defense instruction that deviated from the pattern instruction by adding objective-reasonableness/retreat requirements; the State conceded the instruction was flawed but argued Porter was not entitled to any imperfect self-defense instruction.
Porter moved to suppress custodial statements; the suppression court denied the motion, finding Miranda waiver knowing and voluntary and that Porter’s ambiguous reference to an attorney did not invoke the right to counsel.
Porter also challenged the trial court’s refusal to individually voir dire jurors after a jury note suggesting speculation about matters not in evidence; the court gave a cautionary instruction instead.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Porter)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
1. Imperfect self-defense instruction	Court misstated law and limited battered spouse evidence; instruction prevented jury from considering imperfect self-defense generated by syndrome evidence	Instruction was flawed but harmless because Porter was not entitled to any self-defense instruction in a murder-for-hire context; no "some evidence" of belief of imminent danger at time of killing	Affirmed: instruction erroneous but harmless — Porter was not entitled to self-defense instruction because no evidence she actually, subjectively believed she faced imminent danger at the moment of the shooting
2. Jury note and refusal to voir dire jurors	Note suggested juror misconduct (speculation or outside information about co-defendants’ sentences/life insurance); court should have individually questioned jurors or granted mistrial	Note evidenced mere speculation, not proof of contact; cautionary instruction sufficed; voir dire unnecessary absent evidence of outside influence	Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion in declining individual juror voir dire and giving a curative instruction
3. Suppression of custodial statement (Miranda waiver)	Miranda waiver involuntary or uninformed (detective’s misstatements, confusion about signing); also invoked right to counsel when saying “I guess I need to speak to an attorney then, right?”	Waiver was knowing and voluntary under totality; detective’s misstatement was benign; question about counsel was equivocal, not an unambiguous invocation, so interrogation could continue	Affirmed: waiver valid and request for counsel was ambiguous, so no suppression required

Key Cases Cited

Arthur v. State, 420 Md. 512 (2011) (standards for generating jury instructions; "some evidence" rule)
State v. Marr, 362 Md. 467 (2001) (imperfect self-defense explained; subjective belief need not be objectively reasonable)
State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482 (1984) (elements of self-defense; perfect self-defense as complete defense)
State v. Smullen, 380 Md. 233 (2004) (interaction of battered spouse/child syndrome and self-defense; admissibility and limits)
State v. Peterson, 158 Md. App. 558 (2004) (battered spouse evidence can generate imperfect self-defense in non-confrontational killings when properly developed)
Banks v. State, 92 Md. App. 422 (1992) (statute permitting battered spouse evidence permits admission notwithstanding traditional self-defense limitations)
Robinson v. State, 436 Md. 560 (2014) (harmless-error standard in criminal cases)
Dillard v. State, 415 Md. 445 (2010) (trial court duty to investigate alleged juror misconduct; distinguishing speculation from proof)
Ballard v. State, 420 Md. 480 (2011) (invocation of right to counsel must be unambiguous; equivocal requests do not require cessation of questioning)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (request for counsel must be unambiguous; police may ask clarifying questions)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings required for custodial interrogation)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (after invoking right to counsel, further interrogation forbidden absent counsel or initiation by suspect)
State v. Luckett, 413 Md. 360 (2010) (standard for reviewing Miranda waiver and suppression rulings)