528 F.Supp.3d 2
D.R.I.2021Background
- Porter, a Black defendant, was convicted of second-degree murder in a 2013 Rhode Island trial and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
- During voir dire the prosecutor used peremptory strikes so that the seated jury included no people of color; Porter challenged two strikes but only the strike of Juror 103 (a Black man) is raised in the habeas petition.
- Juror 103 asked to speak privately before voir dire, expressing concern about workplace repercussions at Eleanor Slater Hospital if his service or a particular verdict became known; he nevertheless affirmed he could be fair and impartial.
- The prosecutor’s stated reason for striking Juror 103 emphasized those workplace concerns but explicitly linked them to Juror 103’s race and the fact he was the only African‑American on the panel (the prosecutor inferred risk of "blowback" if the juror voted guilty).
- The trial justice accepted race‑neutral reasons (fear of retaliation and possible injection of workplace matters into deliberations) and granted the strike; the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed and noted excusing for cause might have been appropriate but upheld the Batson ruling.
- Porter filed a §2254 habeas petition arguing the state courts misapplied Batson; the federal district court denied relief under AEDPA, concluding the state court decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and Porter failed to show an unreasonable factual determination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the RI Supreme Court decision was contrary to clearly established federal law (Batson) | Porter: state courts misapplied Batson and allowed a race‑based strike of Juror 103 | State: court applied Batson's three‑step test; decision follows Supreme Court precedent | Held: Not contrary — state court applied Batson and did not announce contradictory rule |
| Whether the RI decision was an unreasonable application of Batson under §2254(d)(1) | Porter: prosecutor’s stated reason was explicitly race‑based and pretextual; de novo review would find Batson violation | State: even if close, AEDPA requires deference; reasonable minds could differ | Held: Not an unreasonable application — state court’s conclusion falls within fair‑minded disagreement, so habeas relief denied |
| Whether the state court made an unreasonable determination of fact under §2254(d)(2) | Porter: challenges the factual assessment surrounding juror’s statements and prosecutor’s motives | State: factual findings must be accepted absent clear and convincing evidence of error; petitioner offers none | Held: No §2254(d)(2) relief — Porter failed to overcome the presumption of correctness |
| Whether, as a matter of federal policy, the court should reach Batson de novo despite AEDPA | Porter: seeks vindication of Batson protections | State: AEDPA limits federal habeas review; appropriate forum for de novo review was direct appeal | Held: Court noted it would likely find a Batson violation on de novo review but is bound by AEDPA to deny relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prohibits race‑based peremptory challenges and sets three‑step test)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (unreasonable application standard requires deference to state court rulings)
- White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (distinguishes incorrect from unreasonable applications under §2254(d)(1))
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (explains §2254(d)(1) "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" framework)
- Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (state court factual findings presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence)
- Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (reaffirms Batson's importance and scrutiny of patterns of strikes)
- Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289 (limits on federal habeas review of claims adjudicated on the merits in state court)
- Cronin v. Comm'r of Prob., 783 F.3d 47 (discusses when a state decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law)
- Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112 (First Circuit: standard for accepting state court factual findings on habeas)