337 F. Supp. 3d 530
E.D. Pa.2018Background
- Porter (owner interest via Porterra, LLC) attempted to announce at a sheriff's sale that a federal declaratory-judgment action regarding the property was pending; he was quickly seized, subdued (chokehold, stun gun alleged), and arrested. His mother also sustained bruises.
- Porter sued individuals (including Ed Chew and Deputy Daryll Stewart) and the City under § 1983, alleging excessive force, First Amendment retaliation, conspiracy, and a Monell claim against the Sheriff/City for a policy forbidding announcements at sheriff's sales.
- At pretrial and early trial Porter (pro se) did not pursue discovery on Monell; the Court initially ruled the Monell claim waived but, after trial testimony including the Sheriff’s admission that a policy forbidding announcements existed, the Court reconsidered and allowed the Monell claim to go to the jury.
- The jury found Chew liable for First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy and awarded Porter $7,500 against Chew and $750,000 against the City on the Monell claim; no punitive damages were awarded. Sankowski recovered separately against Chew.
- Post-trial, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur arguing (inter alia) prejudicial late reinstatement of Monell, erroneous jury instructions, insufficient evidence for First Amendment/Monell liability, lack of causation, and qualified immunity.
- The court denied the City’s post-trial relief and denied remittitur, but granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Chew on the $7,500 award against him on the ground that the jury found Chew did not cause Porter’s compensable injury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reintroduction of Monell claim mid-trial | Porter argued Monell was pleaded and evidence (including Sheriff testimony) supported it; reconsideration was proper | City argued allowing Monell so late was highly prejudicial and waived | Court allowed Monell; found Sheriff’s admission of a policy and Porter's pleadings justified reconsideration and any prejudice cured by permitting additional defense witnesses and curative instruction |
| First Amendment liability for silencing at sheriff's sale | Porter: speech was protected, forum was a limited public forum, policy and Chew’s conduct were viewpoint-discriminatory and not narrowly tailored; no adequate alternatives existed | City: policy was content-neutral time/place/manner regulation to preserve orderly sales and was constitutional; jury instructions usurped factfinder | Court held evidence sufficient for First Amendment violation (limited public forum); jury reasonably could find policy and viewpoint-based enforcement; instructions were appropriate given the record |
| Jury instructions & Rule 51 compliance | Porter accepted charge | City: Court effectively told jury policy was unconstitutional; counsel lacked full written charge before closing and preserved objection | Court found defendants’ objections were vague / not preserved; charge was legally sound and defense had notice of proposed instructions; no new trial required |
| Qualified immunity & causation for Chew | Porter: free-speech right to not be retaliated against was clearly established | Chew: qualified immunity; Supreme Court has not recognized right to be free from retaliatory arrest supported by probable cause; also jury found Chew did not cause Porter's harm | Court held Chew not entitled to qualified immunity (right was clearly established) but granted judgment for Chew on damages because jury found no causation between Chew and compensable injury |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires an unconstitutional policy or custom)
- Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (framework for public fora and government regulation of speech)
- Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2011) (limited public forum analysis and reasonableness test for time, place, manner restrictions)
- Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2004) (speech protections at public meetings and limits on content-based restrictions)
- Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012) (qualified immunity in the context of alleged retaliatory arrest)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two-step analysis)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified immunity protects all but plainly incompetent officials)
- Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2006) (clearly established that exclusion from public meeting must comply with First Amendment)
- Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2008) (three-part inquiry for forum/speech/justification in First Amendment exclusion cases)