Popp v. Popp, 477 Mass. 1022

Joanne and Robert Popp married (1988), divorced (1994), remarried (1996), and divorced again in 2011; their separation agreement (merged into the 2011 divorce judgment) required Robert to pay $12,000/month alimony.
In 2014 Robert petitioned under G. L. c. 208, § 49 to modify alimony, citing a 55% decline in income as a material change of circumstances.
The Probate and Family Court reduced monthly alimony to $8,575 and applied the Alimony Reform Act of 2011 durational limits, setting presumptive termination in August 2020 based on the length of the parties’ second marriage.
Joanne challenged the application of the Act’s durational limits as unconstitutionally retroactive and argued the judge abused her discretion by not awarding alimony beyond the Act’s presumptive termination date.
The Supreme Judicial Court, relying on its decision in Van Arsdale, upheld the constitutionality of the Act’s durational limits and affirmed the judge’s decision, finding the judge considered the relevant § 53(a) factors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Constitutionality of Act's durational limits (retroactivity)	Act improperly applied retroactively to the parties' merged alimony agreement	Act's durational limits are constitutional as applied	Court (per Van Arsdale) held the durational limits constitutional
Whether judge abused discretion by ordering termination at presumptive date	Joanne: judge failed to consider § 53(a) factors (marital lifestyle, lost economic opportunity) and should have deviated beyond presumptive limit	Robert: judge properly considered factors and permissibly applied presumptive termination	Court held judge did not abuse discretion; findings show consideration of relevant factors; no required deviation
Inclusion of first marriage duration in calculating presumptive termination	Joanne: both marriages’ lengths should count toward presumptive termination	Robert: only applicable marriage length governs; judge used second marriage length	Court treated argument as waived for inadequate briefing; not reached on merits
Request for appellate attorney’s fees as frivolous	Joanne appealed; implicitly argues appeal had merit	Robert sought fees claiming appeal was frivolous	Court denied fees, noting unsettled law at time of appeal and that appeal was not frivolous

Van Arsdale v. Van Arsdale, 477 Mass. (2017) (upheld constitutionality of Alimony Reform Act durational limits)
Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653 (2014) (standards for appellate review of alimony modification — abuse of discretion)
Duff-Kareores v. Kareores, 474 Mass. 528 (2016) (trial judge must consider § 53(a) factors when awarding or modifying alimony)
George v. George, 476 Mass. 65 (2016) (motions to extend alimony beyond presumptive termination reviewed based on circumstances at time of motion)
Avery v. Steele, 414 Mass. 450 (1993) (standards on frivolous appeals and fee awards)
Allen v. Batchelder, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 453 (1984) (procedural context for frivolous appeal analysis)