Poole v. Coakley & Williams Construction, Inc.
31 A.3d 212
| Md. | 2011Background
- Appellant Poole, a courier, sues Coakley, Forsgate, Transwestern, Brickman, and others for injuries from slipping on black ice in a Gateway Center parking lot December 21, 2005.
- Poole walked through a running stream of water across the lot, believing it was a safer path than icy areas; he could not see any black ice beneath the water.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for multiple defendants on the theory Poole assumed the risk as a matter of law.
- Court held that knowledge of the risk and its appreciation were not shown as undisputed facts, so summary judgment was improper.
- Maryland appellate courts discussed whether knowledge of black ice could be imputed as a matter of law or reserved for the jury.
- Court overruled Allen’s approach to imputing knowledge and reaffirmed that disputed knowledge issues typically go to the jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment on assumption of risk was proper | Poole argues knowledge of black ice and its danger were not undisputedly known. | Defendants assert Poole knew and consciously walked through a known ice risk, justifying judgment as a matter of law. | Summary judgment improper; knowledge issue must be decided by the jury. |
| Whether Allen’s knowledge standard should govern | Allen supports imputing knowledge from circumstantial evidence to grant judgment at law. | Allen is an outlier; Allen’s reasoning should not control Poole’s case. | Allen overruled to the extent it allows imputing knowledge as a matter of law; jury must decide knowledge in this case. |
| Whether Poole's claims against Transwestern and Brickman are time-barred by the statute of limitations | Discovery rule tolling could apply, delaying accrual until after discovery responses. | Accrual occurred on December 21, 2005; discovery rule and relation back do not apply. | Three-year statute of limitations bars Poole's claims against Transwestern and Brickman; no discovery rule tolling. |
| Whether Judd's third-party liability should be reversed | Judd could be liable to Coakley under subcontract indemnity terms. | Judd’s involvement and liability were contingent; third-party liability required evaluation. | Reverse judgment in Judd; evidence supports contingent liability to Coakley. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418 (Md. 1967) (objective knowledge standard for obvious dangers)
- Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275 (Md. 1991) (assumption of risk requires plaintiff’s knowledge; jury generally resolves disputes)
- Allen v. Marriott Worldwide Corp., 183 Md.App. 460 (Md. Ct. App. 2008) (imputed knowledge from circumstantial evidence; not controlling at law)
- Morgan State Univ. v. Walker, 397 Md. 509 (Md. 2007) (visibly icy parking lot; knowledge imputable to plaintiff in some cases)
- ADM P’ship v. Martin, 348 Md. 84 (Md. 1997) (subjective knowledge standard for risk awareness)
- Cotillo (American Powerlifting Assoc. v. Cotillo), 401 Md. 658 (Md. 2007) (inherent sport risks; explicit examples of knowledge of danger)
- Bull S.S. Lines v. Fisher, 196 Md. 519 (Md. 1950) (unknown or unusual dangers left to jury when disputed)
- C & M Builders, LLC v. Strub, 420 Md. 268 (Md. 2011) (obvious risk or credible knowledge justifies imputation)
- Warsham v. James Muscatello, Inc., 189 Md.App. 620 (Md. 2009) (snow/ice cases and strict approach to assumption of risk)