Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc., 491 P.3d 290

Pamela Pollock, a Tri-Modal employee, alleges she was passed over for promotions because she refused sexual advances by supervisor Michael Kelso and filed a DFEH quid pro quo harassment complaint on April 18, 2018.
Leticia Gonzalez was offered and accepted the promotion in March 2017; the promotion became effective May 1, 2017. There is no record when or whether Pollock was notified she was not promoted.
At the time, FEHA required filing with the DFEH within one year "from the date upon which the alleged unlawful practice . . . occurred." The timeliness of Pollock’s April 2018 filing turned on whether the denial "occurred" in March (offer/acceptance) or May (effective date) 2017.
The trial court and the Court of Appeal held Pollock’s claim time‑barred, treating accrual as the employer’s decision in March 2017; the Court of Appeal also awarded appellate costs to defendants without finding the claim frivolous.
The Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) when a FEHA quid pro quo failure‑to‑promote claim accrues for statute‑of‑limitations purposes, and (2) whether Gov. Code §12965(b)’s limitation on awarding fees/costs to prevailing FEHA defendants applies to appellate costs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does a FEHA quid pro quo failure‑to‑promote claim accrue for purposes of §12960?	Accrual occurs when the promotion takes effect (May 1, 2017).	Accrual occurs when the employer makes the decision/when another employee is offered the promotion (March 2017).	Accrual occurs when the aggrieved employee knows or reasonably should know of the employer’s decision not to promote (actual or constructive notice starts the limitations clock).
Does §12965(b)’s restriction on awarding fees/costs to prevailing FEHA defendants apply to costs on appeal?	Section 12965(b) governs FEHA costs and should limit appellate awards to when claims were objectively groundless.	Rule 8.278 governs appellate costs; §12965(b) does not expressly address appellate costs and should not displace the rule.	§12965(b) applies to appellate courts; an appellate court may not award costs to a prevailing FEHA defendant without first finding the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or that the plaintiff persisted after it clearly became so.

Romano v. Rockwell Internat., 14 Cal.4th 479 (1996) (explains accrual: cause of action accrues when plaintiff can begin and prosecute action; FEHA administrative exhaustion requirement)
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) (limitations period may commence when adverse tenure decision is made and communicated to plaintiff)
Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2008) (claim accrues upon awareness of actual injury; accrual when plaintiff knows or should know of adverse action)
Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4th 97 (2015) (FEHA fee/cost awards governed by §12965(b); prevailing defendant may recover only if claim objectively groundless)
Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.4th 970 (2010) (courts should avoid hindsight bias when assessing objective merit for fee awards)
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (standard for awarding attorney fees to prevailing defendants in discrimination cases)
Richards v. CH2M Hill, 26 Cal.4th 798 (2001) (identifies §12960 as FEHA statute of limitations)
City of Belvedere v. Department of Fair Employment & Housing, 72 Cal.App.4th 84 (1999) (interprets delayed‑discovery extension and accrual when employer’s final decision is communicated)