Polak v. Riverside Marine Construction, Inc.
22 F. Supp. 3d 109
D. Mass.2014Background
- Polak worked for Riverside from Aug 27, 2009 to Mar 1, 2010; injury on Aug 31, 2009 on a dock/barge loading pilings.
- Injury occurred while Polak unloading or loading material; crane/barge operations involved.
- Maine Workers’ Compensation Board approved a July 7, 2011 Consent Decree settling Polak’s workers’ compensation claim.
- Polak filed a 2012 complaint in federal court seeking Jones Act and general maritime relief (Counts I–III) and LHWCA relief (Count IV).
- Riverside moves for summary judgment arguing res judicata bars seaman status; and that Polak was not a seaman and that LHWCA claim fails; court must decide status issue and related preclusion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether res judicata bars polak’s seaman claims | Polak argues Board findings not litigating seaman status; res judicata not apply | Riverside: Consent Decree implicitly found not seaman; res judicata bars Counts I–III | Res judicata applies; Counts I–III barred |
| Whether Polak qualifies as a seaman under Chandris two‑part test | Polak’s duties contribute to vessel’s mission and connection is substantial | Polak is primarily land-based; connection to vessels insufficient | Issue for jury; genuine dispute as to seaman status; not resolved on summary judgment |
| Whether LHWCA claim under §905(b) survives | Polak can pursue §905(b) as vessel owner negligence | No vessel ownership/negligence by vessel caused injury; no basis for §905(b) | Summary judgment for Riverside on Count IV (LHWCA) |
| Gizoni guidance applied to preclusion of seaman claims | Gizoni prevents preclusion where award not litigated | Gizoni not controlling due to formal Consent Decree and litigated benefit award | Gizoni not controlling; Consent Decree precludes seaman claims; supports dismissal |
| Res judicata scope due to Maine law and Board’s consent decree | Board decision not a final adjudication on seaman status for federal claims | Board approval constitutes final adjudication of eligibility as non‑seaman | Board consent decree constitutes final adjudication; bars federal seaman claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1995) (two‑part seaman test; substantial connection and vessel relation; duration matters)
- Gizoni v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 502 U.S. 81 (U.S. 1991) (LHWCA benefits do not automatically preclude Jones Act actions; context matters)
- Wilander v. Dyn McDermott Coal Co., 498 U.S. 337 (U.S. 1991) (seaman status is a status-based inquiry; not just injury location)
- Papai v. Ocean Tug & Barge Co., 520 U.S. 548 (U.S. 1997) (seamanship doctrine and vessel connection guidance)
- Sharp v. Johnson Bros. Corp., 973 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1992) (formal LHWCA award can preclude Jones Act claim; emphasis on settlement/ALJ action)
- Vilanova v. United States, 851 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988) (LHWCA benefits as substitute, but settlement estops FTCA claims; relevance to preclusion)
- Kalesnick v. Seacoast Ocean Servs., Inc., 866 F.Supp. 36 (D.Me. 1994) (board approval of workers’ comp award can preclude federal seaman claims under Maine law)
- Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 418 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2005) (gloss on seaman status with stationary vessels; vessel status not always require sea travel)
- Delange v. Dutra Constr. Co., 183 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (seaman status may be found where duties relate to vessel; time aboard matters)