Poison Spider Bicycles v. Tap Manufacturing
2:16-cv-00148
| D. Utah | Feb 12, 2018Background
- Poison Spyder Customs (PSC), founded 2002 and later acquired by TAP, sells customized off-road Jeep parts nationwide and uses the "Poison Spyder/Poison Spyder Customs" marks and a stylized spider logo; branded apparel comprises ~2% of PSC/TAP sales.
- Poison Spider Bicycles (Plaintiff), a Moab, Utah bike shop, uses the name derived from the local Poison Spider Mesa trail and registered "Poison Spider Bicycles" for retail bike services and apparel; it does not sell off-road vehicle parts.
- Both parties derived their names from the same geographic trail; PSC spells "Spyder" with a "y." The parties use visually different spider logos and target distinct niche markets (Jeep/off-road vs. cycling).
- Defendants moved for summary judgment on federal and state trademark infringement and dilution claims, Utah unfair competition, and the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act; the court considered undisputed facts and plaintiff's deficient opposite filings.
- The court found no evidence of widespread actual confusion (only two anecdotal instances), no showing that plaintiff’s mark is nationally "famous" for dilution, and no proof of unlawful/unfair business practices or consumer-transaction injury under state statutes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trademark infringement / unfair competition (likelihood of confusion) | Plaintiff argued PSC/TAP's use of "Poison Spyder"/logo causes confusion with its "Poison Spider Bicycles" mark, including via apparel and internet listings | Defendants argued marks differ in spelling, appearance, market, channels, and consumer base; minimal apparel sales and no intent to enter bicycle market | Court: No likelihood of confusion; summary judgment for Defendants |
| Trademark dilution (federal and Utah) | Plaintiff claimed its mark is famous and PSC's use dilutes its mark | Defendants: Plaintiff's mark is not widely recognized beyond local/niche market and lacks statutory "fame" required for dilution | Court: Plaintiff failed to show national fame; summary judgment for Defendants |
| Utah Unfair Competition Act (infringement-plus) | Plaintiff alleged Defendants intentionally traded on its goodwill via internet/SEO to divert searches and sales | Defendants: No evidence of intentional unfair practice or of metadata/SEO manipulation; plaintiff produced unauthenticated screenshots and speculation | Court: No evidence of "unfair/ unlawful" conduct beyond trademark claim; summary judgment for Defendants |
| Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act | Plaintiff alleged deceptive practices in connection with consumer transactions | Defendants: No consumer transaction or cognizable consumer loss shown | Court: Statute inapplicable; no admissible evidence of consumer harm; summary judgment for Defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sea Harvest Seafood Co., 251 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2001) (summary judgment standard and drawing inferences for nonmoving party)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant’s initial summary judgment burden and nonmovant must show genuine factual dispute)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing genuine issue for trial)
- Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (nonmovant cannot rely on metaphysical doubt)
- King of the Mtn. Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 1999) (multi-factor test for likelihood of confusion)
- Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. AT&T, 22 F.3d 1527 (10th Cir. 1994) (likelihood-of-confusion analysis and de minimis actual confusion)
- Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2002) (value of surveys and actual confusion evidence)
- Big Dog Motorcycles, LLC v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (D. Kan. 2005) (impact of differing logos/mark presentations and limited apparel sales on confusion analysis)
- Vail Assocs. v. Vend-Tel-Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 853 (10th Cir. 2008) (strength of mark analysis and limits of incontestable registration)
