Pogorzelski v. Patenaude & Felix APC, 1:16-cv-01330

Plaintiff Molly Pogorzelski received a May 10, 2016 debt-collection letter from law firm Patenaude & Felix APC after TD Bank assigned her debt for collection.
The letter stated the debt had been assigned to the firm to "initiate collection efforts" and referred to the creditor as the firm’s client; it also instructed, "If you wish to avoid further collection activity, please contact us at (866) 606-3290."
Pogorzelski alleges the letter was misleading because it implied calling (and immediate payment) was the only way to avoid legal action and did not disclose that Patenaude was not retained to file suit or that it employed no Wisconsin-licensed attorneys.
She asserts violations of multiple FDCPA provisions (15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(3), 1692e(10), 1692f, and 1692g) for providing materially misleading information and depriving her of FDCPA-mandated disclosures.
Patenaude moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing Pogorzelski lacks Article III standing because she pleaded only a bare statutory/procedural violation without a concrete injury.
The district court denied the motion, holding Pogorzelski sufficiently alleged a concrete informational injury cognizable under Article III given the FDCPA’s purpose and Congress’ judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Pogorzelski has Article III standing to sue for FDCPA violations	Pogorzelski says she suffered a concrete "informational injury" because the letter denied required disclosures and gave materially misleading information to an unsophisticated consumer	Patenaude says the complaint alleges only a bare procedural/statutory violation without any concrete or appreciable risk of harm, so no Article III injury	Court held Pogorzelski alleged a concrete injury: misleading debt-collection communications are the sort of harm FDCPA was enacted to prevent, so standing exists

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (explaining Article III "injury in fact" requires concrete and particularized harm; Congress can elevate intangible harms but not every procedural violation suffices)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Congress may define injuries but cannot override Article III standing requirements)
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (recognizes informational injuries can be cognizable under federal law)
Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017) (refused standing where retention of personal data posed only speculative risk)
Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2016) (no standing where a procedural FACTA violation did not create an appreciable risk of harm)
Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2002) (standard that allegations in complaint are accepted as true on motion to dismiss)
Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing FDCPA’s private-right-of-action and its deterrent purpose)
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (Article III case-or-controversy principles)