Poe v. LaRiva, 834 F.3d 770

Jimmie Poe was convicted in 1996 of narcotics offenses including a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) and sentenced to 360 months; trial jury instructions later conflicted with Richardson v. United States.
After Richardson (1999), Poe first filed a § 2241 habeas petition (1999) but the district court told him to file under § 2255; his subsequent § 2255 was denied as untimely and this court affirmed in 2006.
Alleyne (2013) held that any fact that increases a mandatory minimum is an element that must be found by a jury. Poe filed a new § 2241 petition (2014) arguing Alleyne invalidated his CCE conviction/sentence.
The district court denied the § 2241 petition, concluding Poe must proceed under § 2255 and that Alleyne is a constitutional decision that is not retroactive on collateral review.
On appeal, Poe argued § 2241 was appropriate under the § 2255 savings clause (relying on Davenport/Webster line), or alternatively that his filing should be treated as permission to file a successive § 2255.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed: Poe cannot use § 2241 because Alleyne is a new constitutional rule and is not retroactive on collateral review; construing the filing as a successive § 2255 would be futile for the same reason.

Issue	Poe's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Poe can use 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (savings clause) to attack his sentence based on Alleyne	Alleyne invalidates an element used to increase his mandatory minimum, so § 2241 is available	§ 2241 is available only where § 2255 is inadequate; Alleyne is a constitutional decision and not a statutory interpretation meeting Davenport	Denied — § 2241 unavailable because Alleyne is constitutional, not a Davenport statutory rule
Whether Alleyne is retroactive on collateral review	Alleyne should apply to Poe's case	Alleyne is not retroactive; Supreme Court did not make it retroactive	Denied — Alleyne is not retroactive on collateral review
Whether Davenport/Webster permit § 2241 here (i.e., structural inadequacy of § 2255)	Davenport/Webster allow savings-clause relief in Poe’s circumstances (Poe points to Richardson nexus)	Davenport requires reliance on a statutory-interpretation rule; Webster is limited to new evidence/penalty-evidence contexts and does not help Poe	Denied — Poe fails Davenport’s conditions and Webster is inapplicable
Whether this petition should be treated as permission to file a successive § 2255	Convert the § 2241 to a successive § 2255 so Alleyne can be considered	Successive § 2255 would be futile because § 2255(h) permits only Supreme Court-retroactive constitutional rules and Alleyne is not retroactive	Denied — futile to treat as successive § 2255 because Alleyne is not retroactive

Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (holding underlying violations for CCE are elements requiring jury unanimity)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (new rule: any fact increasing mandatory minimum is an element for the jury)
Poe v. United States, 468 F.3d 473 (7th Cir.) (prior appellate decision affirming denial of Poe’s untimely § 2255)
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998) (tests when § 2255 is inadequate and savings clause permits § 2241)
Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing savings-clause and Davenport framework)
Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. en banc) (narrow holding permitting § 2241 when new evidence shows penalty is categorically unconstitutional)
Crayton v. United States, 799 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2015) (Alleyne is not retroactive)
Simpson v. United States, 721 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2013) (Alleyne announced a new rule of constitutional law)
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (example of new constitutional rule referenced in Webster context)