Pocono Summit Realty, LLC v. Ahmad Amer, LLC, 52 A.3d 261

PSR owns ~12.35 acres on Pocono Summit Rd; Amer owns ~21.386 acres adjacent.
The PSR Property and Amer Property were formerly one parcel; subdivided in 1989 as Lot 2 (PSR) and Lot 1 (Amer).
In 1989 Montovision Realty, Inc. conveyed Amer Property and recorded a Declaration of Covenants restricting Lot 2 from operating a grocery store.
On June 3, 1998 Amer acquired the Amer Property; the Restriction remained in place; 2006 PSR and MPRP planned a grocery store on adjoining property not encumbered by the Restriction.
PSR and MPRP intend to share parking and utilities on the PSR Property to support a supermarket on the adjoining property; Amer argues this violates the Restriction; PSR argues it does not.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amer, finding that the PSR Property cannot be used for parking/utilities that support a grocery store on the adjoining property; PSR and MPRP appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Restriction prohibit the operation of a grocery store on PSR Property and related parking/utilities.	PSR argues only the store itself is prohibited on Lot 2; parking/utilities for an off-site store are not prohibited.	Amer contends any parking and utilities necessary for operating a grocery store violate the Restriction.	Yes; the Court held that the term 'operation' encompasses parking and utilities necessary to operate a grocery store, restricting use of Lot 2.
Is Siciliano v. Misler controlling or distinguishable for interpretation of 'operation' and parking.	Plaintiffs rely on Siciliano to limit parking to segments on restricted land.	Distinguishable; Siciliano involves parking tied to a store located on restricted land, not adjacent land.	Distinguishable; plain language here prohibits any part of Lot 2 from being used for operating a grocery store, not just parking tied to a store on restricted land.
What standard governs interpretation of restrictive covenants in this context.	Restrictive covenants are disfavored and strict construction should favor unrestricted use.	Strict construction against enforcing restraints; use must be interpreted by the covenant's plain terms.	Court applied strict construction but accepted ordinary meaning to find a plain disregard of terms; upheld lower court.

Siciliano v. Misler, 399 Pa. 406, 160 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1960) (parking restrictions limited when not both store and parking on restricted land)
Baumgardner v. Stuckey, 735 A.2d 1272 (Pa. Super. 1999) (strict construction against enforcement of covenants on land use)
Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Bailey, 421 Pa. 540, 220 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1966) (definition of operation and ordinary meaning of covenant terms)
Vernon Township, 855 A.2d 873 (Pa. 2004) (use of factors to interpret restrictive covenants and their purpose)
Richman v. Mosites, 704 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. 1997) (restrictive covenants are limitations on land use and strictly construed)
Jones v. Park Lane for Convalescents, 384 Pa. 268, 120 A.2d 535 (Pa. 1956) (ambit of ambiguous covenants resolved in owner's favor when language unclear)
Bykowski v. Chesed, Co., 425 Pa. Super. 595, 625 A.2d 1256 (Pa. Super. 1993) (demurrer-equivalent standard for judgment on the pleadings)
O’Brien v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 689 A.2d 254 (Pa. Super. 1997) (review of declaratory judgments and legal standards)
State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Christie, 802 A.2d 625 (Pa. Super. 2002) (standard of review for declaratory judgments)
Currid v. Meeting House Restaurant Inc., 869 A.2d 516 (Pa. Super. 2005) (contract interpretation in land-use restrictive covenants)