PO II Steve Topasna, Guam Police Department Does 1-100 v. Government of Guam Lourdes Leon Guerrero in her capacity as Governor of Guam CAPT. Steven Ignacio, in his capacity as Chief of Police, Guam Police Department Mr. Edward Birn, in his capacity as Director, Guam Department of Administration, 2021 Guam 23

Petitioner Steve Topasna, a Guam Police Officer II, sought relief under DOA Personnel Rule 8.406 during Guam’s COVID‑19 State of Emergency.
Rule 8.406(A) authorizes excused paid absence when natural disasters or other emergency conditions create unsafe working conditions; (B) requires an official proclamation; (C) empowers appointing authorities to determine facility closures and provides paid leave for non‑essential employees while facilities are closed; (C)(2) provides double pay or compensatory leave for essential employees required to remain on duty; (D) treats employees already on leave as released for the period the facility is closed.
Topasna petitioned the Superior Court for (1) paid leave without charge to leave under 8.406(A) or (2) double pay/compensatory leave under 8.406(C) for work performed during the emergency.
The Superior Court denied mandamus relief, finding Topasna failed to prove predicate conditions for double pay (that GPD was "closed" and others were on excused leave) and that he had been designated essential.
Topasna appealed, arguing subsection (A) alone—triggered by the State of Emergency—creates an entitlement to paid leave without requiring facility closure.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a gubernatorial State of Emergency alone entitles employees to paid leave under DOA Rule 8.406(A), or whether facility closure (and appointing‑authority determination) is a required predicate	Topasna: A State of Emergency alone triggers mandatory paid leave under 8.406(A) ("shall"), so facility closure is not required.	Government: Subsections (B)–(D) show a proclamation plus an appointing authority determination to close facilities is required; paid leave applies only while facility is closed; essential employees are excluded and get double pay if kept on duty.	Affirmed. Facility closure (as determined by the appointing authority under 8.406(C)) is a predicate for paid leave; Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying mandamus.

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639 (specific provision controls over a general one)
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (specific statute not controlled by a general statute absent clear intent)
United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (historical articulation of the particular‑vs‑general canon)
Black & Decker Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 986 F.2d 60 (regulations are interpreted using statutory canons)
Lexin v. Superior Court, 222 P.3d 214 (related provisions should be read in pari materia)
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (interpretation should give effect to all provisions)