135 N.E.3d 702
Mass.2019Background
- Antonio Gomes, a Plymouth police officer, previously served as a permanent-intermittent police officer (PIPO) and purchased credit for that intermittent service in 1998; PERAC later informed the Plymouth Retirement Board that charge was incorrect and the board refunded him.
- After CRAB’s decision in MacAloney (firefighters), the Plymouth board sought to recoup the refunded amounts (plus buyback interest) from Gomes, following the board’s long-standing policy that members must remit payments to purchase prior intermittent service credit.
- Gomes appealed administrative rulings; DALA and CRAB sided with PERAC’s interpretation that members must pay under G. L. c. 32, § 4(2)(c); the Plymouth board sought Superior Court review.
- The Superior Court granted judgment for the Plymouth board, holding § 4(2)(b) (which mandates credit for up to five years of PIPO service) did not expressly require remittance and thus no payment was due.
- The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding § 4(2) must be read as a coherent whole: subsection (b) specifies how much service is creditable (measurement) while subsection (c) supplies the purchase formula (payment), and subsection (c) contains no exemption for PIPOs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether member police officers must remit buyback payments to obtain credit for prior PIPO service | Plymouth: § 4(2)(b) says boards "shall credit" up to five years and does not mention payment, so members entitled to credit without payment | CRAB: read § 4(2) as a whole; § 4(2)(c) is the general buyback formula and contains no PIPO exemption, so payment required | Court held payments required; reversed Superior Court and affirmed CRAB |
| Whether "permanent-intermittent" falls outside § 4(2)(c)’s reference to "intermittent employment" | Plymouth: different phrasing shows Legislature exempted PIPOs from § 4(2)(c) | CRAB: "permanent-intermittent" is a subcategory of "intermittent" and both subsections share the same introductory scope | Court held PIPOs fall within the intermittent category for purchase purposes |
| Whether § 4(2)(b) can be read alone to render § 4(2)(c) superfluous | Plymouth: isolating (b) avoids payment for PIPOs | CRAB: reading (b) alone would nullify (c)’s purchase formula and create surplusage | Court held subsections must be read together; avoiding surplusage supports CRAB |
| Whether administrative deference to CRAB’s interpretation is appropriate | Plymouth: urged plain-text reading supports board | CRAB: its construction of the statute it administers merits deference | Court applied de novo review of law but gave great weight to CRAB’s expertise and affirmed its interpretation |
Key Cases Cited
- Retirement Bd. of Stoneham v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 476 Mass. 130 (Mass. 2016) (discusses statutory interpretation and deference to CRAB)
- Costa v. Selectmen of Billerica, 377 Mass. 853 (Mass. 1979) (describes nature of permanent-intermittent police employment)
- Gallagher v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 1 (Mass. App. Ct. 1976) (context for purchase formula for prior intermittent service)
- Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113 (Mass. 2018) (plain-language statutory interpretation principles)
- Joslyn v. Chang, 445 Mass. 344 (Mass. 2005) (court will not create exceptions where statute is silent)
- King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (U.S. 2015) (court may not rewrite inartfully drafted statutes against clear legislative intent)