Plymire v. Kijakazi
1:20-cv-00574
| E.D. Wis. | Jul 26, 2021Background
- Alondra Plymire applied for Supplemental Security Income alleging disability beginning March 15, 2015; application denied initially and on reconsideration; ALJ hearing held March 7, 2019; ALJ denied benefits on April 12, 2019; Appeals Council denied review.
- ALJ found severe impairments of bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, and PTSD, but concluded she did not meet listings and assigned an RFC for full range of exertional work with nonexertional limits: simple, routine, repetitive tasks; low-stress work; occasional changes and limited social interaction.
- ALJ found no past relevant work and, at step five, identified jobs (laundry worker, dishwasher, sorter) that exist in significant numbers, concluding Plymire not disabled.
- Plymire challenged the ALJ’s assessment of symptom severity (fatigue/napping, memory/concentration), the ALJ’s treatment of variable functioning from bipolar disorder, and the weight given to treating providers’ opinions.
- The magistrate judge found multiple factual errors in the ALJ’s decision (misstating earnings as SGA, understating reports of fatigue, insufficient analysis of daily activities and variable functioning) and concluded the ALJ improperly evaluated symptom severity and treating opinions.
- Court vacated the Commissioner’s decision and remanded for further proceedings so the ALJ can reassess symptom severity (including naps/need to lie down), variable functioning, daily-activity reasoning, and the treating providers’ opinions consistent with SSR 16-3p and applicable Seventh Circuit precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Symptom severity / credibility of fatigue and napping | Plymire: ALJ ignored records showing frequent fatigue and need to nap; overstated evidence to the contrary | SSA: ALJ reasonably relied on treatment notes showing intact cognition and limited objective support for daily naps | Court: ALJ made factual errors (understated fatigue reporting) and must reassess symptom severity on remand |
| Need to lie down / effect on RFC | Plymire: naps and need to lie down materially limit RFC | SSA: ALJ found no medical necessity for daily naps based on record | Court: If ALJ accepts need to nap, RFC must be reassessed; remand required to resolve this factual issue |
| Variable functioning from bipolar disorder | Plymire: bipolar disorder is episodic; ALJ failed to account for fluctuations and ‘‘bad’’ episodes | SSA: ALJ relied on many treatment notes showing improvement and intact functioning at times | Court: ALJ failed to address episodic/variable nature adequately; must evaluate how fluctuations affect RFC on remand |
| Weight to treating mental-health providers’ opinions | Plymire: treating psychiatrist and therapist opinions discounted improperly; subjective-report rationale is weak for mental-health providers | SSA: ALJ discounted opinions as based on claimant’s reports and inconsistent with objective treatment findings | Court: Because the ALJ’s reasons partly rest on the flawed symptom assessment, he must reassess the treating-source opinions on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- L.D.R. by Wagner v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 2019) (court will affirm ALJ if correct legal standards applied and decision supported by substantial evidence)
- Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2011) (bipolar disorder is episodic and admits regular fluctuations)
- Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2017) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2019) (ALJ’s symptom-assessment entitled to deference absent ‘‘patently wrong’’ findings)
- Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118 (7th Cir. 2014) (ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence but may not cherry-pick)
- Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 2010) (impermissible cherry-picking when ALJ ignores entire lines of contrary evidence)
- Price v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2015) (a treating mental-health provider’s opinion should not be discounted merely because it rests on patient report)
- Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2018) (treating physician’s opinion entitled to controlling weight if supported and not inconsistent)
- Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 2000) (treating physician rule statement)
- Forsythe v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2016) (daily activities may be compelled by necessity and do not necessarily show ability to work)