Planned Parenthood v. State
342 P.3d 684
Mont.2015Background
- 1995 Montana Parental Notification Act required physicians to notify parents/guardian before providing an abortion to minors under 18; it was challenged in Wicklund (1999), and the district court held it unconstitutional; State did not appeal.
- 2011 Parental Notification Act (passed by referendum) applied only to minors under 16 and lacked an explicit burden of proof for judicial bypass; 2013 Parental Consent Act required parental consent for minors under 18 and set a preponderance burden for bypass; the 2013 Act repealed the 2011 Act but was temporarily enjoined in this litigation.
- Plaintiffs (Planned Parenthood and Dr. Henke) sued in 2013 challenging the 2011 and 2013 Acts as unconstitutional and argued issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) barred the State from relitigating the constitutional questions decided in Wicklund.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, holding the issues were identical to Wicklund and the State was precluded from defending the newer statutes.
- The Montana Supreme Court granted de novo review of the question whether issue preclusion applied and reversed, holding the identity-of-issues element failed because the later statutes differ in material ways from the 1995 Act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiffs' Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether issue preclusion bars the State from defending the 2011 and 2013 statutes | Wicklund decided identical constitutional issues; State should be precluded from relitigating | Wicklund addressed a different statute; new statutes differ materially so preclusion does not apply | Reversed district court: issue preclusion does not apply because issues are not identical |
| Whether the identity-of-issues requirement is satisfied despite statutory differences (age scope; notice vs consent; burden for judicial bypass) | Differences are immaterial to constitutionality; same compelling interests recur | Differences (age cutoff, consent vs notice, burden of proof) are material and can affect constitutional analysis | Court: differences are material; identity requirement not met |
| Whether the State waived the argument that issues are not identical by not raising it earlier | Plaintiffs/Dissent: State did not adequately raise this argument below or in opening brief | State: raised the identical-requirement argument in district-court briefing and on appeal (more fully in reply) | Court: argument was raised sufficiently and, in any event, the appellate court may independently decide legal question de novo |
| Whether the prior Wicklund judgment (1999) was a final adjudication capable of precluding the State | Plaintiffs: Wicklund was a final ruling and preclusive | State: disputes applicability because statutes differ | Court did not reach remaining preclusion elements because identity prong failed; thus preclusion not applied |
Key Cases Cited
- Stapleton v. First Sec. Bank, 675 P.2d 83 (Mont. 1983) (identity of issues is most important element of issue preclusion)
- Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brainard, 265 P. 10 (Mont. 1928) (prior judgment is not a bar unless the precise question was raised and determined)
- Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948) (issue preclusion must be confined to matters identical in both proceedings)
- Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90 (1991) (appellate courts may identify and apply proper construction of governing law regardless of parties’ exact theories)