931 F.3d 530
6th Cir.2019Background
- Ohio enacted Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.123 (2004), tying lawful mifepristone use to FDA approval letter/labeling and effectively banning the then‑common evidence‑based off‑label regimen (200 mg through 63 days).\
- Planned Parenthood and other providers sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the statute as vague and unconstitutional (including for lacking a health‑or‑life exception), and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.\
- After an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued a preliminary injunction (Sept. 2004) enjoining enforcement for patients whose health or life was at risk; the Sixth Circuit affirmed the injunction as to the health‑or‑life‑exception claim and remanded several times to clarify scope.\
- The litigation produced a narrowed, as‑applied preliminary injunction that remained in effect for nearly 12 years while appeals and proceedings continued.\
- In 2016 the FDA amended mifepristone labeling to allow the evidence‑based regimen (200 mg up to 70 days), the parties dismissed the case as moot, and Planned Parenthood sought attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for work on the preliminary injunction.\
- The district court awarded $382,529.98; Ohio appealed, arguing Planned Parenthood was not a "prevailing party," the fees should be reduced for limited success, and historical (2006) rather than 2016 rates should apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Planned Parenthood is a "prevailing party" under § 1988 | Preliminary injunction was merits‑based, provided a concrete benefit, and materially altered legal relations for ~12 years | Injunction was preliminary/narrow and later mooted by FDA action so plaintiff did not "prevail" | Prevailing party: injunction was merits‑based, long‑lasting, and produced a material alteration; contextual inquiry supports § 1988 relief |
| Whether the fee award must be reduced to reflect limited success | Fees were for work primarily on the successful health‑or‑life claim and already excluded later merit work; no further blanket reduction needed | Fees should be drastically reduced because plaintiff won on only one claim and sought broader relief | No abuse of discretion: district court considered degree of success, applied reductions in the requested time period, and explained its reasoning |
| Whether rates should be historical (2006) or current (2016) | Adjustment to 2016 rates requested to compensate for long payment delay; aligns with § 1988 goals | Use historical 2006 rates; district court erred in awarding 2016 rates | District court did not abuse discretion in using 2016 rates given long delay and explained why current rates comport with fee‑award objectives |
| Whether district court adequately explained and supported the lodestar and adjustments | District court evaluated hours, Johnson factors, applied a 10% duplication reduction in request, and justified no further reductions | District court failed to appropriately tie hours/rates to success and used improper methodology | Affirmed: district court provided a "concise but clear" explanation, relied on Johnson/Hensley, and did not commit clear error |
Key Cases Cited
- Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542 (U.S.) (purpose of § 1988 is to ensure enforcement of federal rights by enabling counsel to bring meritorious civil‑rights suits)\
- Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (U.S.) (preliminary injunctions ordinarily do not confer prevailing‑party status when later undone on the merits)\
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (U.S.) (degree of success guides fee awards; lodestar method and possible proportional reduction)\
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (U.S.) (no prevailing‑party status based on catalyst theory; relief must be judicially sanctioned)\
- McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591 (6th Cir.) (when preliminary injunctions and mootness complicate § 1988, apply a contextual, case‑specific inquiry)\
- Binta B. ex rel. S.A. v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 608 (6th Cir.) (district court must give concise but clear explanation for fee awards)\
- Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co., Inc., 510 F.3d 610 (6th Cir.) (district court may apply current or historical rates but must explain how choice furthers fee objectives)\
- Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (U.S.) (supports awarding rate adjustments to reflect delay and achieve reasonable fees)\
- Watson v. Cty. of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir.) (vacatur on mootness grounds does not necessarily defeat prevailing‑party status)\
- Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 653 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir.) (distinguishing vacatur on mootness from merits‑based undoing when assessing prevailing‑party status)