799 F. Supp. 2d 1048
D.S.D.2011Background
- District court considered a challenge to South Dakota House Bill 1217, enacted 2011, on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
- The Act comprises four main parts: Pregnancy Help Center Requirements, a 72-Hour waiting period, Risk Factors, and Coercion Provisions.
- Planned Parenthood affiliates and Dr. Carol Ball sued defendants in official capacities alleging CHC and related provisions constrain abortion rights and speech.
- Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction; a hearing occurred June 27, 2011.
- Court applied Dataphase factors and considered severability given potential unconstitutionality of several sections.
- Court analyzed applicability and constitutionality of specific provisions rather than the Act as a whole.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Pregnancy Help Center Requirements implicate free speech. | Planned Parenthood argues compelled speech violates First Amendment. | Daugaard argues requirements are informational, not compelled speech. | Yes; provisions implicate compelled speech and must be narrowly tailored. |
| Whether Pregnancy Help Center Requirements unduly burden abortion rights. | Plaintiffs contend requirements create substantial obstacle in large fraction. | State asserts less restrictive means could suffice; burden not substantial. | Yes; likely undue burden under Casey framework. |
| Whether the 72-Hour Requirement imposes an undue burden. | Waiting period and two-trip requirement create substantial obstacles for many women. | Delay is not insurmountable and depends on physician scheduling. | Yes; constitutes undue burden for a large fraction of relevant cases. |
| Whether Coercion Provisions are unconstitutionally vague. | Desire vs. coercion is undefined, creating ambiguity for physicians. | Coercion defined by statute; plain meaning should apply. | Yes; coercion provisions are impermissibly vague. |
| Whether Risk Factors Requirement is narrowly tailored and constitutional. | Requires disclosure of numerous potentially unverified risk factors; violates speech and practical access. | Statute permits truthful, non-misleading information to be provided. | Yes; not narrowly tailored and likely unconstitutional. |
Key Cases Cited
- Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Minn., 910 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1990) (vagueness standard for compliance in abortion-related statutes)
- Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc; compelled speech and abortion-related regulation)
- Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (U.S. 1992) (undue burden standard for abortion regulations)
- Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (U.S. 2007) (undue burden considerations; scope of permissible regulation)
- Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (U.S. 1997) (less restrictive alternatives and tailoring of speech regulations)
- Hurley v. Irish-Amer. Gay, Lesbian & Bi React., 515 U.S. 557 (U.S. 1995) (free speech protections in compelled or distinctive contexts)
- Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (U.S. 2000) (comparison on abortion regulation scrutiny)
- U.S. v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 1995) (context of compelled speech in government action)