Planet Fitness International Franchise v. JEG-United, LLC, 1:20-cv-00693

Planet Fitness (franchisor) and franchisee JEG-United (owns five Mexican gyms) negotiated a Side‑Letter (Mar. 5, 2019) to pursue an Area Development Agreement to expand in Mexico.
JEG‑United alleges Planet Fitness intentionally interfered with three prospective business opportunities: (1) lease/expansion negotiations with Soriana (retailer/landlord); (2) a preliminary partnership or purchase deal with Carlos Ibarra/Ibarra Group (use of confidential info to lure the deal); and (3) purchase negotiations for California Fitness locations.
Planet Fitness moved for judgment on the pleadings seeking dismissal of JEG‑United’s tortious‑interference counterclaim (Count III), arguing it would be a necessary party to any future franchise agreements and therefore cannot be a third‑party interferer.
JEG‑United contends Planet Fitness misused its franchisor position to sabotage these third‑party deals and take the opportunities for itself, alleging intentional and improper interference.
The court evaluated the pleading under the Rule 12(c)/12(b)(6) standard and found JEG‑United plausibly alleged tortious interference, denying Planet Fitness’s motion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether franchisor can be a "stranger" and thus liable for tortious interference with franchisee's deals	Planet Fitness, as franchisor, acted as a third party to JEG‑United’s relations with Soriana, Ibarra, and California Fitness and interfered improperly	Planet Fitness claims its franchisor role and right to approve franchises makes it a necessary party and insulated from liability	Court: Franchisor status does not as a matter of law preclude liability; alleged interference concerned separate third‑party relations and survives pleading challenge
Whether JEG‑United must plead actual malice for tortious interference under NH law	JEG‑United: need only plead intentional and improper interference under NH law	Planet Fitness: plaintiff must plead actual malice (bad faith/ill will)	Court: New Hampshire requires intent and impropriety, not actual malice (ill will); Restatement §§766/766B apply
Whether the pleadings plausibly state tortious interference claims under Rule 12(c)	JEG‑United: factual allegations support reasonable inference of improper intent and resulting damage	Planet Fitness: facts show only exercise of franchisor approval rights, so no plausible claim	Court: Accepting JEG‑United’s allegations as true, its claim is plausible and judgment on pleadings is denied

Zipperer v. Raytheon Co., 493 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2007) (standard for judgment on the pleadings)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility standard for federal pleadings)
Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (pleading plausibility and Rule 12 standards)
Hughes v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30 (N.H. 2005) (elements of tortious interference under NH law)
Tessier v. Rockefeller, 162 N.H. 324 (N.H. 2011) (interference requires actor be a stranger to the contract)
Demetracopoulos v. Wilson, 138 N.H. 371 (N.H. 1994) (intentional and improper interference standard)
Roberts v. Gen. Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532 (N.H. 1994) (franchisor’s proper exercise of contractual rights contrasted with improper interference)
Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249 (N.H. 1978) (adoption of Restatement §766 for tortious interference)
Baker v. Dennis Brown Realty, Inc., 121 N.H. 640 (N.H. 1981) (adoption of Restatement §766B for prospective contractual relations)
Burger King Corp. v. Ashland Equities, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (franchisor conduct can, in some circumstances, support interference claims)