Plainfield Pike Development, LLC. v. Victor Anthony Properties, Inc.
160 A.3d 995
R.I.2017Background
- Plainfield Pike Development (plaintiff) owns lots 53 and 90; Victor Anthony Properties (defendant) owns adjacent lot 11 through which a roughly 400-foot roadway (Elks Lane) runs.
- An April 11, 1922 deed expressly granted to the owners of lot 12 (later subdivided to create lots 53 and 90) a right-of-way over lot 11 "with teams and otherwise," and numerous later deeds referenced similar language though some intermediate deeds omitted it.
- Plaintiff sought and obtained zoning approval to build an auto-repair facility (Protech) on lot 90; defendant blocked physical access to the roadway and plaintiff sued for declaratory relief (existence and scope of easement).
- After a bench trial, the Superior Court found an appurtenant easement over lot 11 in favor of plaintiff’s property, determined the easement was about 22.75 feet wide, and concluded it was not limited to a specific use or abandoned.
- Defendant appealed only the scope-of-use ruling, arguing plaintiff’s proposed use (ingress/egress for an automotive repair business) was an unreasonable extension of the 1922 grant and asserting judicial estoppel based on plaintiff’s conduct before the zoning board.
- The Supreme Court affirmed: it deferred to the trial justice’s factual findings, held the grant’s language permitted reasonable uses beyond "teams," rejected defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s factual reliance, and declined to apply judicial estoppel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Existence and scope of easement | 1922 deed and chain of title create an easement "with teams and otherwise," so use is not limited and includes reasonable modern uses (ingress/egress for Protech) | Proposed use for auto-repair is an unreasonable extension of the 1922 grant; historical use was limited (farm/ice access) | Court affirmed easement exists, runs with land, ~22.75 ft wide, and is not limited to a specific historical use; reasonable modern uses allowed |
| Abandonment by nonuse / omission in chain of title | Easement runs with the land despite some deeds omitting reference; no unequivocal intent to abandon | Omission from some deeds and nonuse show abandonment | Court found no clear and convincing evidence of abandonment; easement persisted despite gaps in recital |
| Reliance on extrinsic evidence for scope/location | Deed language controls scope; extrinsic evidence (surveys, maps, historical uses) supports location and width | Some extrinsic evidence (references to ice company, 1970 Agreement) was inaccurate or concerned different easement | Court held deed language governed scope; trial justice reasonably relied on deeds plus corroborating surveys for location; defendant’s attacks unavailing |
| Judicial estoppel based on zoning-board submissions | Plaintiff’s positions before board and in court were consistent or at least not misleading; Superior Court jurisdiction appropriate for declaratory relief | Plaintiff omitted asserted access use before the board to obtain approval and should be estopped from asserting it in Superior Court | Court found no evidence plaintiff misled the board or gained unfair advantage; trial justice did not abuse discretion in rejecting estoppel |
Key Cases Cited
- Kinder v. Westcott, 107 A.3d 321 (R.I. 2015) (express grant requires writing showing intent to create easement rather than license)
- Carpenter v. Hanslin, 900 A.2d 1136 (R.I. 2006) (where grant contains no scope limit, easement may be used for reasonable uses of dominant estate)
- Grady v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 962 A.2d 34 (R.I. 2009) (reasonableness of use within an easement is a factual question for the trier of fact)
- Iadevaia v. Town of Scituate Zoning Bd. of Review, 80 A.3d 864 (R.I. 2013) (judicial estoppel is discretionary; courts consider unfair advantage from inconsistent positions)