Pivaral Gonzalez v. Simpson, 3:22-cv-02714

Background

Nehemias Pivaral Santos was killed when struck by a company-issued vehicle driven by Caylee Smith, an employee of Eastman Chemical, while he was helping change a tire on the shoulder of Interstate 45.
Plaintiffs are Santos's father (individually and as estate representative), brother, and girlfriend; defendants are Smith and Eastman.
Plaintiffs sued for direct negligence by Eastman (negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision), gross negligence and wrongful death against Smith, vicarious (respondeat superior) liability, and various damages including for pain and suffering.
Eastman stipulated Smith was acting within the course/scope of employment, triggering the gross negligence standard for direct liability, but allowing ordinary negligence for vicarious liability.
Defendants moved for summary judgment and to dismiss several claims; Plaintiffs moved to exclude portions of defense expert testimony.
The court granted summary judgment to Eastman on all direct negligence claims and to Smith on one gross negligence theory, but allowed claims against Smith for gross negligence for distracted driving to proceed, and limited certain damages.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Direct negligence (Eastman): hiring, retention, training, supervision	Eastman was grossly negligent in hiring, retaining, training, or supervising Smith given Smith's driving record and distracted driving	Smith's prior incidents were minor and did not make her an extreme risk; no duty to train on commonly known hazards (distracted driving)	Eastman granted summary judgment—no gross negligence proven on any direct claims
Gross negligence (Smith): driving onto shoulder	Smith was aware of and disregarded the risk by driving onto the highway shoulder and hitting Santos	No evidence Smith was consciously aware she was on the shoulder; disputes testimony credibility	Summary judgment for Smith—no evidence of subjective awareness of risk
Gross negligence (Smith): distracted driving	Smith was grossly negligent by using electronic devices at high speed before the crash	Any device use did not cause crash, and high-speed swerving was the primary issue	Sufficient evidence; claim proceeds against Smith on theory of grossly negligent distracted driving
Damages for pain and suffering (Santos)	Plaintiffs claim Santos endured conscious pain before death	No evidence of consciousness after impact	Summary judgment for defendants—no evidence Santos was conscious after impact
Ms. Moreno's (girlfriend) negligence claim	Moreno suffered harm deserving compensation	Complaint insufficiently specific on alleged injury	Dismissed without prejudice; may be repleaded
Mr. Santos's (brother) bystander claim	Bystander shock from contemporaneous observance of brother's death	Allegations insufficient as to element of shock	Claim survives motion to dismiss
Motion to exclude defense experts	Defense experts' opinions on accident reconstruction and body matter not qualified/reliable	Experts qualified; criticisms go to weight not admissibility	Denied (with partial ability to renew at trial re: forensic analyst)

Key Cases Cited

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard requires viewing facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and considering the standard of proof at trial)
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Keith, 970 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. 1998) (outlines elements for bystander recovery in Texas)
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. 2007) (sets standard for showing incompetence in negligent entrustment/driving cases)
Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994) (gross negligence cannot be determined with hindsight, but must be based on conduct at time of incident)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (claim must be plausible, not just possible, on a motion to dismiss)