Pitts v. Hobbs
2013 Ark. 457
| Ark. | 2013Background
- Kenneth Ray Pitts was convicted in 2006 of second-degree sexual assault and sexual indecency with a child and sentenced as a habitual offender to consecutive terms (720 months and 180 months). The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.
- In 2010 Pitts filed a pro se petition in Lincoln County seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus challenging the calculation of his parole eligibility.
- The circuit court denied and dismissed the petition with prejudice; Pitts appealed. While his appeal was pending, he attempted to file a pro se motion to amend his complaint to assert that federal sentencing guidelines and other grounds rendered his conviction or sentence invalid.
- The Supreme Court held the circuit court lost jurisdiction to entertain the proposed amendment after the record was lodged in the appellate court, and dismissed the motion to amend.
- The core merits dispute concerned whether Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-609 (Act 1805 of 2001) applied to Pitts’s 720-month second‑degree sexual‑assault sentence so as to render him ineligible for parole.
- The Court concluded the ADC correctly applied § 16-93-609(b) because (1) the statute was in effect when Pitts committed the offense and (2) Pitts had prior qualifying sexual‑offense convictions; thus no ex post facto violation occurred and declaratory relief/mandamus were not warranted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the circuit court could entertain Pitts’s motion to amend after the record was lodged on appeal | Pitts sought leave to file an amended complaint asserting constitutional and sentencing‑guideline defects | Appellees argued the circuit court lost jurisdiction once the record was lodged in the appellate court | Denied — circuit court lost jurisdiction after the record was lodged; motion to amend dismissed |
| Whether Act 1805 (§ 16‑93‑609) was properly applied to bar parole for the 720‑month sentence | Pitts argued § 16‑93‑609 could not be applied because it was not referenced on the judgment‑and‑commitment order | ADC argued parole eligibility is governed by law in effect at the time of the crime and is administered by the ADC; Act 1805 applied because Pitts committed the offense after Aug. 13, 2001 and had prior qualifying convictions | Held for appellees — § 16‑93‑609(b) properly applied; ADC’s calculation was correct |
| Whether application of Act 1805 constituted an ex post facto violation | Pitts claimed retroactive disadvantage because the statute was applied to his sentence | Appellees: Act 1805 was in effect at the time of the offense and was applied to the present offense, not to past convictions | Held — no ex post facto violation; statute was not retrospective and did not disadvantage by retroactive application |
| Whether prior-trial evidentiary/trial‑error claims could be relitigated | Pitts reasserted trial‑error arguments (admission of prior convictions) | Appellees relied on law‑of‑the‑case and prior appellate resolution | Held — those issues were precluded by law‑of‑the‑case doctrine (previous appellate decision resolved them) |
Key Cases Cited
- Wiggins v. State, 299 Ark. 180 (1989) (declaratory judgment in criminal context is civil in nature and prerequisites for declaratory relief)
- Brown v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 483 (1986) (elements of an ex post facto violation require retrospective application and disadvantage to the offender)