Pittman v. State
300 Ga. 894
| Ga. | 2017Background
- On March 3, 2010 Maxwell Fiandt was shot and killed after three men (Reid, Marquez, Pittman) went to his apartment purportedly to buy marijuana; surveillance, cell records, DNA, eyewitness accounts, and witness statements placed the three at the scene.
- Reid pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and testified for the State; Marquez also testified and implicated Pittman as the shooter; Pittman presented alibi witnesses and did not testify.
- A Fulton County jury convicted Pittman of felony murder (predicated on aggravated assault), conspiracy to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; acquitted on malice murder; other counts nolle prossed.
- Pittman appealed, arguing (1) the State failed to corroborate accomplice testimony (motion for directed verdict should have been granted), and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to sever his trial from Marquez.
- The Court affirmed the convictions (finding sufficient corroboration and no deficient performance by counsel) but found sentencing error: the trial court improperly merged the conspiracy conviction into the felony-murder sentence and vacated that portion of the sentence for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency/corroboration of accomplice testimony under former OCGA § 24-4-8 | Pittman: State relied on accomplice Reid and failed to provide independent corroboration; directed verdict warranted | State: other evidence (cell records, DNA, surveillance, Barrett ID, Marquez testimony, eyewitnesses) corroborated accomplice testimony | Court: Evidence (considering entire record) sufficiently corroborated accomplice testimony; denial of directed verdict proper |
| Ineffective assistance for not moving to sever from co-defendant Marquez | Pittman: defenses were antagonistic and strong evidence against Marquez prejudiced Pittman; counsel should have sought severance | State/trial court: counsel investigated severance, reasonably chose not to file based on client statements that Marquez would exonerate Pittman; strategic decision | Court: Counsel’s performance not deficient; Strickland standard not met |
| Sentencing/merger of convictions | Pittman: (not argued on appeal) trial court merged conspiracy into felony murder at sentencing | State/trial court: merged conspiracy and aggravated assault into felony murder | Court: Merger of aggravated assault into felony murder proper, but merger of conspiracy into felony murder was error because each offense requires proof of an element the other does not; vacated and remanded for resentencing on conspiracy count |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898 (explaining accomplice corroboration rule under former OCGA § 24-4-8)
- Benbow v. State, 288 Ga. 192 (corroboration need not match accomplice testimony in every detail)
- Clark v. State, 296 Ga. 543 (corroboration may come from another accomplice)
- Murray v. State, 295 Ga. 289 (on reviewing directed-verdict rulings courts may consider all evidence)
- McNeely v. State, 296 Ga. 422 (credibility and conflict resolution are for the jury)
- Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49 (courts may raise merger issues sua sponte on direct appeal)
- Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842 (principles for determining when offenses must merge)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance two-prong test)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (strong presumption counsel’s performance was reasonable)