Pittman v. State, 300 Ga. 894

On March 3, 2010, Maxwell Fiandt was shot to death after Melville “Teddy” Reid, Hector Marquez, and Jahvon Pittman entered Fiandt’s apartment complex; Reid had previously arranged entry by contacting Fiandt.
Reid later pleaded to voluntary manslaughter and testified for the State; Marquez testified that Pittman accidentally shot Fiandt during a robbery attempt.
Pittman was tried jointly with Marquez; the jury convicted Pittman of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), conspiracy to commit armed robbery (Count 6), aggravated assault (Count 7), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 8); acquitted on malice murder; other counts were nolle prossed.
Evidence included Reid’s and Marquez’s testimony, cell phone records, DNA, surveillance video, a witness identification (Barrett), and physical evidence from the scene.
Pittman moved for directed verdict at close of State’s case arguing lack of corroboration for accomplice testimony; he also later claimed trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to sever his trial from Marquez’s.
The trial court denied the directed verdict and rejected the ineffective-assistance claim; on appeal the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed convictions but found error in sentencing merger and vacated/reserved resentencing for one count.

Issue	Pittman’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Sufficiency/corroboration of accomplice testimony (directed verdict)	Reid’s accomplice testimony was uncorroborated and insufficient to go to jury	Entire trial evidence (phone records, DNA, video, ID, Marquez’s testimony) corroborated accomplice testimony	Denied; evidence sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia to sustain convictions
Ineffective assistance for not moving to sever from co-defendant Marquez	Counsel should have moved to sever because defenses were antagonistic and Marquez’s strong evidence prejudiced Pittman	Counsel reasonably investigated, expected Marquez to exculpate Pittman, and made a strategic decision not to seek severance	Denied; counsel’s decision was reasonable under Strickland
Merger at sentencing between conspiracy and felony murder	(raised by Court sua sponte) Conspiracy conviction merged into felony murder at sentencing	Trial court merged conspiracy into felony murder	Reversed as to merger; conspiracy should not have merged into felony murder; remand for resentencing on that count
(Ancillary) Admission of co-defendant testimony and jury credibility determinations	Alibi and conflicts warranted acquittal	Credibility and conflicts are for jury; alibi rejected by jury	Affirmed; credibility issues do not require reversal

Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898 (discusses corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for judging sufficiency of the evidence)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)
Murray v. State, 295 Ga. 289 (review of directed verdict considers all evidence)
Clark v. State, 296 Ga. 543 (corroboration may include testimony from another accomplice)
Benbow v. State, 288 Ga. 192 (corroborating evidence need not match accomplice testimony in every particular)
Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49 (court may address merger issues on direct appeal)
Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842 (analysis distinguishing merger as a matter of law vs. fact)